Information asymmetry and personal incentives are two main causes of manipulation and distortion of financial statements. One possible strategy is to reward executives in an attempt to align the interests of owners and directors. The distortion and manipulation of information leads to the representation of financial statements. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between financial incentives of executives and the representation of financial statements. The study was based on the library research and the analysis of panel data. It investigated the financial information of 108 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange Market from 2011-2017 (756 company-year). The results of hypothesis testing suggested that there was a significant positive relationship between the managers’ rewards and the representation of financial statements. Also, there was a significant positive relationship between the board duality and the representation of financial statements. With regard to the significance level and the estimation coefficient, the independence of the board of directors, the board size and the concentration of ownership were inversely related to the representation of financial statements.
