



SADRA'S ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN RATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF CORPOREAL RESURRECTION

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ABSTRACT

One of the fundamental principles of Islam is the problem of resurrection. Islamic philosophers consider the principle of resurrection essential, but they are divided as regards its being spiritual or corporeal. Philosophical efforts of Avicenna and Sheikh Eshraq did not lead to the rational acceptance of corporeal resurrection. Sadr al-Mutalhin of Shiraz is the only one whose philosophical effort has led to the rational demonstration of corporeal resurrection. Sadra regards corporeal resurrection a noble pillar of faith and considers its despiser infidel both from rational and traditional points of view. The achievements of Sadra owe their existence to some basic principles of resurrection – which can be divided into two fundamental ontological and anthropological classes. By a descriptive-analytic method, in the current essay we seek to explain the ontological foundations and principles of Sadra concerning corporeal resurrection like primacy of existence, determinateness of existence, analogical gradation of existence, substantial movement and personal unity of existence and show their relevance and the role each one of them has in corporeal resurrection.

Keywords: Transcendent Theosophy, Shirazi (Sadr al-Mutalihin), Doomsday, Corporeal Resurrection, Spiritual Resurrection, Ontological.

INTRODUCTION

The problems of resurrection in general and corporeal resurrection in particular are among the most important religious, philosophical and theological issues. Islamic philosophers, who are committed to reasoning and rationalism, have also conducted rational investigations concerning human destiny and acceptance of corporeal resurrection. Islamic philosophers, who are generally classified in three prominent schools of Peripateticism, Illuminationism and transcendentalism, have sought to discuss various aspects of resurrection using the philosophical foundations of their school as well as independent rational approach or dependent (rational-intuitive) approach. All Islamic philosophers consider the principle of resurrection as one of the stages of life for human spirit and soul; but Avicenna who has a completely pure philosophical and rational method demonstrated the spiritual resurrection with firm arguments but he couldn't provide a rational proof for corporeal resurrection. Thus, he accepted this principle according to the Islamic Sharia and based on revelation; Sheikh Ishraq though like his predecessors has made numerous rational efforts for demonstration of the premises of resurrection and proving the existence of ideal world and incorporeality of detached imagination the major part of his contribution to the issue of resurrection was mainly focused on the demonstration of ideal resurrection which constitutes the very scaffold of spiritual resurrection.

Sadra though believes that the understanding of resurrection issues is among the complicated affairs (Shirazi, 1981, vol. 9: 179) in most of his works like Arshiyah, Al-Shawahid al-Rububyah, Tafsir al-Quran, Al-Mazahir al-Elahyah, Sharh al-Hidayah al-Athiryah has discussed it in general form and in such works as Zad al-Musafir, Mafatih al-Gheyb, Al-Mabda wa al-Maad and also in his distinguished work entitled Al-Hikmah al-Mutalyah has delineate the foundations and principles of corporeal resurrection and by studying the words of other philosophers has answered the existing objections in this regard. He succeeded to provide a rational explication of resurrection through delineation of its ontological and anthropological principles – which include six to fifteen principles in various works.

1. GENERAL REMARKS:

1-1- Terminology of Resurrection:

- **A.** Vocabulary: *Maad* the Arabic equivalent of resurrection is driven from the word "*Aud*" in the sense of returning and going back (Qurayshi, 1992, vol. 2: 66); of course, a returning after giving up something or some place (Ragheb Isfahani, 1992, vo. 1: 593); linguists have offered some modalities for returning like an infinitive beginning with "*mint*", adverb of time and adverb of place (Ragheb Isfahani, 1992, vo. 1: 594; Ibn Athir, 1988, vol. 3: 316; Tehrani, 1986: 766). These points are all correct when the word "*Aud*" turns transitive with the preposition "*ela*" [toward] but if it becomes transitive with the preposition "ala" [over] it will mean profit, benediction and mercy (Hassanzadeh Amuli, 2002, vol. 5: 10); among the other meanings that have been attributed to "maad" one can refer to "*sara*" in the sense of becoming and transformation (Ibn Athir, 1988, vol. 3: 316-317).
- **B.** Term: "maad" or resurrection has been interpreted as returning and coming back in the Doomsday (Kharrazi, 1995, vol. 2: 176); returning to life for second time and human returning to new life; and according to Khajeh Nasir Tusi, "origin is the first nature and return is one's coming back to that nature" (Khajeh Tusi, 1995: 9); philosophers have interpreted "resurrection" as "returning to the ends" (Mohaqeq Sabzewari, 2004: 406). Sufis consider it as "Universal Divine Names" in the same way that they refer to "Universal Existential Names" by the term "origin" (Tahanawi, 1996, vol. 2: 1570).

By resurrection some intend the "Doomsday" and in the verses of Holy Quran the phrase "*yum al-Qiyamah*" [Doomsday] is frequently found (Baqarah: 85, 113, 174, 212; Al-e Emran: 77, 161, 180; Anaam: 12; Araaf: 32); because in the Afterlife the creatures rise for the Lord. Accordingly, some have divided "Doomsday" into two: "Minor Doomsday" in the sense of separation of spirit from the body and its transition to the purgatory and "Major Doomsday" in the sense of human return in the Day of Judgment (Shirazi, 1984: 635; id, 1981: 103; Shahrzuri, 2004: 564).

In short, resurrection as a term refers to the return of creatures and particularly human being in the Doomsday when the records of creatures in general and humans in particular are evaluated (according to its general acceptance) and it will be determined whether they go to hell or to the paradise. Then, resurrection – based on the difference of opinion of these groups of scholars concerning the reality and quality of human return – is a description for human



being in general and in the view of a group of scholars it is a description of human soul and spirit while others consider it an attribute of human body.

2~1~ Truth of Death:

Death, terminologically speaking, refers to the separation of spirit from body and the lack of spirit and vital bodily faculties. Avicenna believes that the greatest source of anxiety for every human being is his death and its reason is one's ignorance of the truth of death (Avicenna, 1979: 339-340). But according to philosophical foundations and Islamic texts, the truth of death is nothing but second birth in the afterlife (Avicenna, 1979: 339-340). Avicenna explains the truth of death as follows: death is nothing but the fact that soul leaves the means and tools with which it works (which are its members and called together body) (Avicenna, 1979: 340); then, death means soul's departure of its body. The thing that becomes destructed is its body and what remains and is not transformable is the soul (Shahrzuri, 2004: 262-558). Although Sadra contends that the knowledge of resurrection is hidden from the scholars (Shirazi, 1987, 7: 10); he has made several remarks concerning the truth of death and the fact that it is not tantamount to the annihilation of soul and spirit; rather it causes the annihilation and separation between the truth of man and what is not an essential part of human reality (i.e. body); and for explication of immortality of spirit he offers three traditional evidences (Shirazi, 1981: 281-282). Then, according to the above analysis, fear of death is meaningless because this fear has its origin in epistemic ignorance of man concerning death.

3~1~ Types of Resurrection:

3~1~1~ Spiritual Resurrection:

Spiritual resurrection which is propounded versus corporeal or bodily resurrection is a mode of resurrection in which only the spirit is at stake and the pleasures and pains occur to the spirits; no matter if we believe in the return of the body along with the spirit or we just believe in the pure spiritual resurrection. Since human body has been decayed and destroyed inside the grave in this world and what remains from man and is transferred to the world of immortality is human spirits (Morvardi, 1998: 201). Then, it is human spirits that are resurrected and interrogated in the Doomsday and in the Afterlife everything happens to human spirits and souls (Avicenna, 2004: 16; Mir Damad, 2001: 270; Ibn Haytham Bahrani, nd: 156). Then, blessed or cursed both are the attributes of spirit and it is human soul that reaches bliss or curse and it is this spirit that enjoys rational happiness or spiritual torment.

3~1~2~ Corporeal Resurrection

Although one should say that corporeal resurrection consists of the return of body alone, the majority of those scholars who propound corporeal resurrection versus the spiritual resurrection believe that human body returns with human spirit and it is body associated with spirit that returns. Fazil Meqdad has argued that resurrection represents the second existence for bodies after death and separation of elements (Helli, 1986: 206). And Mir Seyyed Sharif interprets it as the return of bodily elements after their separation and return of spirits to bodies after their departure in the time of death (Eiji, nd.: 289). Others like Fakhr Razi and his followers have interpreted "body" in bodily or corporeal resurrection as "material" and considered resurrection a material reality (Al-Tahanawi, 1996, vol. 1: 675). In other words, they believe that man is resurrected in his original form; then in the afterlife the spirit accompanied by the corporeal body rises from the dead (Hosseini Tehrani, 2001, vol. 6: 129-130).




Then, spiritual resurrection is a description for human spirit and soul and consists of the return of spirit in the afterlife for receiving spiritual pleasures and blesses or divine torments – regardless of whether we believe in the return of body or not – and corporeal resurrection consists of the return of body in the afterlife for receiving its particular pleasures regardless of whether we believe in the return of body or not.

4-1- Theories of the Quality of Resurrection

Although resurrection is of two spiritual and corporeal types there are five alternative theories of its quality:

4-1-1-: Pure corporeal resurrection and denial of spiritual resurrection; according to this theory, man is the body alone and thus it is this body that meets the reward and punishment in the afterlife and nothing else; because as Avicenna suggests, they do not believe in rational soul (Avicenna, 2004: 16). Sadra attributes this theory to the jurists and traditionalists and argues that since they see the spirit a corporeal current in the body like the current of fire in the coal and water in the flower, then they believe in pure corporeal resurrection and deny the spiritual resurrection (Shirazi, 1975: 374).

4-1-2: Pure spiritual resurrection and denial of corporeal resurrection: this group of scholars believe that resurrection is limited to human spirit and it is the latter that is rewarded, punished, blessed and cursed and nothing else; since with the death the body becomes decayed and annihilated and no return is deemed for it, it is this spirit that should be rewarded or punished. The scholars who believe in this theory are considered generally to be peripatetic philosophers (Shirazi, 1975: 375).



The majority of Christian thinkers and the proponents of the theory of transmigration of souls believe in this theory; but for two reasons one should not identify this issue with the idea of transmigration of souls:

- A. In transmigration of souls a spirit returns to other bodies while in this theory the spirit returns to its original body not any other body.
- B. Resurrection refers to the return of spirits to the bodies in the afterlife but in the transmigration of souls we are speaking of the return of spirits to the bodies in this world (Tahanawi, 1996, vol. 1: 676; Taftazani, 1990, vol. 5: 90; Helli, 1986: 406).

4-1-4: Suspension of the idea of resurrection and all theories regarding it: Galen believed in this theory because he did not see any difference between soul and temperament and if one dies his soul will die and get annihilated and what is annihilated cannot be returned because the return of the annihilated is impossible and since Galen has not reached a clear decision regarding whether the soul is one and same with temperament or not he has suspended the idea (Avicenna, 2004: 17; Fakhr Razi, 1986, vol. 2: 297; Shirazi, 2008: 86).

4-1-5: Denial of spiritual and corporeal resurrections: this theory is attributed to the classic western philosophers, natural scientists, atheists and agnostics. This group of scholars argues that man is nothing but this sensible body which only enjoys temperament quality and faculties



and accidents all of which are annihilated with the death and from man nothing remains but discrepant material elements and his happiness and wretchedness are limited to the worldly sensible pleasures and pains (Shirazi, 1975: 375; id, 1981: 269; id, 1981, vol. 9: 164).

2. Sadra's Ontological Principles in Demonstration of Corporeal Resurrection

2-1- Sadr al-Mutalihin of Shiraz and His Transcendent Theosophy:

Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Yahya Qawami better known as Sadr al-Din Shirazi and the Foremost of Theosophers or Mulla Sadra was born in 1572 and died in 1640 (Shirazi, 2008: 267). Peripatetic philosophical method of reasoning, Illuminationist philosophical method, mystical initiation method and theological method of reasoning continued in Islamic world and came together in one point and formed a unique current (Mutahari, nd.: 1986: 176-179). The point where these four currents meet each other is called "Transcendent Theosophy". The school of Sadra is methodically similar to Illuminationism in the sense that it simultaneously believes in argument and intuition but it is different from it in view of its principles and deductions. Sadra's philosophy is not an eclectic philosophy rather it is a special philosophical system though various intellectual Islamic methods have been involved in its emergence we have to consider it still an independent intellectual system (Mutahari, nd.: 181-182). From Sadra some fifty works have remained among which the work entitled *Al-Hikmah al-Mutalyah fi al-Asfar al-Aqlyah al-Arba* is the most detailed and comprehensive one.

2-2- The Place of Resurrection in Sadra's Philosophy

Sadra considers the belief in corporeal resurrection as one of the noble pillars of faith and declares its despiser an infidel both from rational and traditional points of view and mentions this issue in his various works (Shirazi, 1975: 376; id, 1984: 605; id, 1981: 270). Sadra regards the resurrection one of the levels of soul, then one should search for the discussions regarding resurrection in the chapters written by Sadra on the "science of soul" (Shirazi, 1981, vol. 8). In the majority of his works he has studied the issue of resurrection and its premises but in some works he has dealt with it in more details:

- A. In "Al-Mabda va al-Maad" Sadra conducts a study of the levels of soul, its theoretical and practical faculties, immortality of soul following the death of body, denial of transmigration of soul, explanation of true happiness, corporeal resurrection and the like (Shirazi, 1975: 223-502).
- B. In "Asrar al-Ayat" he discusses the knowledge of fate, reward in grave, resurrection, straight path, Doomsday horn, scale and evaluation of deeds, paradise, hell and so on and so forth (2004: 166-232).
- C. In "Zad al-Musafir" such issues as the pleasure and pain of corporeal resurrection, nature of reward and punishment, the difference between internal and external punishment (2002: 382-249).
- D. In "Al-Arshyah" the second chapter of the book is devoted to the discussion of the science of resurrection and the corporeal resurrection is explained based on six principles and then the issue of the unity of human identity in the afterworld and world and in the next chapter he deals with the differences between worldly and otherworldly bodies (id, 1982: 245-249).



- E. In "Al-Shawahid al-Rububyah" the incorporeal nature of soul which is a requirement of the resurrection – demonstration of second life, ideas of resurrection and its spiritual or corporeal modes, and via eleven chapters the triple worlds, meeting the angels, quality of otherworldly events without matter, quality of imagination of actions and resurrection are dealt (id, 1981: 179-336).
- F. In his renowned work "Al-Hikmah al-Mutaliyah", Sadra has dealt with the issues of resurrection in detailed form and has devoted the section eight of "Asfar" to the science of soul and in the section nine he discusses the worldly and heavenly transmigration, soul's established attributes and its stages, spiritual and corporeal resurrection and various affairs related to resurrection (id, 1981).

2-3- Ontological Principles

Despite the efforts made by Islamic philosophers including the Peripatetic and Illuminationist ones concerning the issue of resurrection, it was Sadra who succeeded to provide rational arguments based on certain principles and offer a rational demonstration of corporeal resurrection. Sadra considers himself to be indebted to divine inspirations in demonstration of corporeal resurrection. Sadra has mentioned different principles as used by him for proving the corporeal resurrection. In one place he has mentioned seven principles (id, 1982: 245-249) and in some cases he has mentioned eleven principles (id, 1981: 185-197). In another book he has mentioned twelve principles (id, 2002: 17-25).



These principles can be divided into two groups of ontological and anthropological principles and the current essay is concerned with the former principles. We do not intend here to demonstrate each one of the principles mentioned by Sadra because the ontological principles which serve as the pillars of transcendent theosophy have been already discussed in full details in the works of Mulla Sadra; we just shortly discuss these principles and their relevance with corporeal resurrection.

2-3-1- Primacy of Existence

Primacy of existence is one of the most important principles of corporeal resurrection and one could say that it is the principle of all philosophical principles of Sadra. In *Asfar* (id, 1981, vol. 9: 185) and *Zad al-Musafir* (id, 2002: 18), Sadra has used the principle of primacy of existence as the basis for demonstration of corporeal resurrection but in "Al-Shawahid al-Rububyah", "Al-Arshyah", "Al-Mabda va al-Maad", "Mafatih al-Gheyb" and "Tafsir Surah Yasin" this principle has not been mentioned and perhaps the reason for this is the fact that this principle is the principle on which all other principle depend; then with mentioning those principles there will be no need for these principle.

Primacy of existence contrary to the common view is not an ancient issue (Mutahari, nd., vol. 4: 192) and in the philosophy of Aristotle, even in the philosophy of Farabi or in the philosophy of Avicenna no such issue is discussed (Mutahari, nd., vol. 6: 556-557). This problem was raised for the first time in the age of Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra to the effect that whether the primacy is with existence or essence; this problem has its origin in two sources. First source is the philosophical discussions of theologians while the other source is the words of mystics of course since the time of Muhy al-Din onward (Mutahari, nd., vol. 9: 59-61).

The problem of primacy of existence is based quadruple affairs:

- A- Falsity of the principle of skepticism and sophistry and demonstration of the reality of objects;
- B- Abstraction of two concepts of essence and existence from the real objects;
- C- Difference of each one of the two concepts of existence and essence;
- D- The external reality is the extension of one of the two concepts not both of them (Allameh Tabatabaei, 1999, vol. 1: 41).

After accepting the reality as a principle and the idea that the reality in the outside world is one our mind identifies two aspects in the objects: essence and existence. Essence is what divides the objects into various types and existence is what stands before nothingness and all existing objects enjoy it. Now we have four alternative theses here:

- A- Both aspects of essence and existence are hypothetical and no one of them is objective.
- B- Both aspects have external objectivity, i.e. existence and essence together.
- C- Among these two aspects one is mentally posited and the other is of external objectivity; the first degree reality is itself identical with the reality while the second degree reality is what the mind posits it. Then, this third hypothesis is itself of two possibilities: that we would say that essence is real and objective and the existence is mentally posited; and
- D- The other possibility is that we would say that existence is objective and essence is mentally posited.

Three alternative theses are denied:

The first thesis is another expression of idealism as the denial of the self-evident affairs that human mind understands and the denial of the most real issues, then our philosophers never consider these theories among the philosophical theories.

No one believes in the second thesis because its requirement is that every object to be two contradictory objects (Allameh Tabatabaei, vol. 2: 65).

The third thesis that gives the primacy to essence is invalid based on various reasons which have been mentioned in many works like Asfar, Al-Shawahid al-Rububyah, Sharhi Manzumeh. This thesis says that what is identical with the external objectivity is the essence of things and their existence is abstracted from the essence.

The fourth thesis is the primacy of existence and mentally-positedness of essence. The proponents of the thesis of primacy of existence believe that these numerous essences are the abreactions of the mind. What constitutes the external objectivity is the existence itself and it is mind that abstracts the essences from the existence; then it is "existence" that is extended throughout the objective reality; objectivity means "existence" and the latter is equal to "objectivity". Of course "existence" is of various levels and the mind abstracts a particular essence from every level (Mutahari, nd, vol. 9: 65-72 'Shirazi, 1981, vol. 9: 185). Although five alternative interpretations have been offered of the primacy existence and mentally-positedness of essence (Fayazi, 2013: 9-48) and we do not discuss them here because they lie outside the scope of the current essay.



Sadra who believes in the primacy of existence has offered numerous reasons for its demonstration.¹ We mention one of these reasons as an example: existence with which every other thing is realized cannot be itself mentally posited, then existence deserves to exist more than anything else (id, 1981: 60; also cf. id, 2008: 26; id, 1984: 9-10).

The relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection:

Firstly, this principle is among the most fundamental principles of Sadra's philosophy which is the basis of other principles and foundations of Sadra's ontology and secondly, according to this principle, existential entities exist in the outside world while the essences are nothing but ghost like entities and the existential entities are not essentially heterogeneous; the principle of existence whether worldly or otherworldly will not be more than one and the differences are in view of the heterogeneity of essences, then, the resurrected men in the Doomsday are essentially identical with the men in the world and the differences could be traced back to essences which are mentally posited (Ashtyani, 2001: 112).

2-3-2- Determinateness of Existence

In "Mabda va Maad" (Shirazi, 1975: 386) and in his interpretation of "Surah al-Yasin" Sadra has allocated the second principle to "determinateness" of body. (id, 1987, vol. 5: 372). But in other works he considers the second principle to be the determinateness of existence (id, 1981, vol. 9: 185^s id, 2002: 213). Then, accidental changes like changes in time, place, quantity, quality and other things, do not transform the individual determinatenecy (cf. id, 1981: 262; id, 1984: 596).

The relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection: since determinateness has its origin in existence, then the unity of human soul is the basis of determinateness of man and this is why the latter does not change following any quantitative, qualitative, temporal or spatial change ((Shirazi, 1975: 384; idem, 1981: 262; idem, 1984: 596).

According to Sadra, body can be conceived in two ways: first, as its being the body for a particular soul and secondly, in view of its essence as one of the physical objects in this world; body in view of the second conception is exposed to transformation, growth, deficiency and destruction like the other physical entities, but body in view of its belonging to a particular body owes its existence to the existence of the soul to which it belongs (id, 1987, vol. 5: 373). Thus conceived, boy will remain associated with its soul and will not be destroyed and this association will last until the Doomsday; then changes which happen in fields other than an object's truth including the material or essential or accidental changes do not result in the change in the object's reality, in the same way that the changes in place or a man's moving from this world to the otherworld does not change human truth; because determinateness has its origin in an individual's existential reality and nothing else and transformations even in the form of aging or youth or changes in body members will not be harmful. Then, the identity of the worldly and otherworldly bodies and lack of difference between them will be defendable and human rising from the dead will be possible in true sense of the word (Shirazi, 1975: 384).



¹ Professor Fayazi has mentioned thirty six reasons in support of the thesis of primacy of existence which can be found in the phrases of the classic and contemporary philosophers. Fayazi's work is exceptional in delineation of the alternative interpretations of the thesis of primacy of existence and mentally-positedness of essence (Fayazi, 2013).

2-3-3- Analogical Gradation of Existence

Analogical gradation or hierarchicality of existence is one of the other key principles of Mulla Sadra in corporeal resurrection. The question that persuades Mulla Sadra to resort to the thesis of special gradation is as follows: could we prove any diversity for the unique existence as a whole? If the answer is positive how could one preserve diversity with unity? Briefly speaking, there are four alternative theses:

- A- Sufis thesis: "unity of existent and existence"; God is the real existent and other entities are virtual beings.
- B- Thesis offered by Mohaqeq Dawani: "unity of existence and diversity of existents"; God own the real existence while creatures do not have "real existence" rather they are attributed to "real existence" like the word "Tamer" in Arabic that is used to refer to the one who sells "date".
- C- Peripatetic thesis: "diversity of existence and existent"; thus all existents will be totally different from each other. In other words, we have just diversity and nothing more and the diversities are not traced back to any unity;
- D- Sadra's thesis: "unity in diversity"; (Misbah Yazdi, 2009, vol. 1: 84-87) analogical gradation consists of the fact that existence is a unique truth which has numerous levels. In other words, we have both real diversity and real unity and these both have the same basis; said differently, what makes the difference is exactly the same thing that is shared by the two (Allameh Tabatabaei, 1999, vol. 1: 85-89 Shirazi, 1981, vol. 9: 181). After demonstration of the fact that primacy is for the existence and the latter is a simple reality in the sense that it has not been constituted of any external or even mental and rational element we come to the point that what distinguishes the diversified existents. In response to the latter question one should say that this distinction is neither by the differentia nor by the accidents that lie outside the reality of thing rather the truth of existence is itself the source of diversity – of course, not in the way that is offered by Peripatetic philosophers according to whom diversity is rooted in the very reality of the thing itself – and the existence as such is of diversity besides its essential unity (Ashtyani, 2002: 213-214). If existence enjoys intensity and if a level of existents enjoys weakness all these have their origin in the existence itself and the same thing that is considered as the shared ground of existents has also divided them and the distinctions do not come from the outside (Shirazi, 1981: 135; id, 1981, vol. 6: 149).

The relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection: firstly, this principle is required in the other ontological principles and secondly, when in the analogical gradation it is demonstrated that man has various levels and the intensity and weakness of levels refer to the intensity and weakness in human existence, then one should say that human worldly truth is not different from his otherworldly truth and in all levels man's humanity and his identity will not be different and the identity of these two men will not be diversified, then the rewarded and punished are the same that existed in the world (id, 1981, vol. 9: 186). Thus, man in the otherworld does not have any essential difference with worldly human because they are two manifestations of the same truth.

2-3-4- Substantial Movement:



This principle – which has been also referred to as "intensity and weakness in existence" – has been noted in most of the works of Mulla Sadra (id, 1981, vol. 9: 186; id, 1982: 246). Sometimes this principle is mentioned along with the principle of "analogical gradation" as an integrated notion (id, 1982: 246) and sometimes it is discussed without mentioning the principle of gradation – of course in this case it should be stated that the principle of gradation is taken for granted because substantial movement is secondary to it (id, 1981, vol. 9: 186).

The philosophers before Sadra believed that movement occurs in four categories of "quantity, quality, place and disposition" but Sadra argued that movement takes place in the substance of all material entities and the difference of movement in accidents is the result of the difference in the movement of formal substances (Ashtyani, 2001: 53). Movement is the fluidity in the existence of substance and accident, then it is one of the analytical features of existence and philosophical secondary intelligibles not one of the external accidents of the existents and a concept like essential notions. Then, the subject of movement is identical with the moving object and the movement does not require the object independent of the adjective because the existence of analytical features is the same and one with the existence of the moving and motionless existents that do not require any independent object to be attributed to rather the existence of adjective and the noun – whether substance or accident – is the same and whatever is the cause of the noun the same is also the cause of adjective too (Misbah Yazdi, 2009: 331-334). We need to pay close attention to some problems in this regard:



- 1- One needs to know that the problem of movement is not an exclusive issue of man and it is also concerned with other creatures too: "verily every physical substance has a moving nature and there is something motionless in it whose relation to it is like the relationship of spirit to the body" (Shirazi, 1981, vol. 3: 104).
- 2- Existence as the primary, determinate and analogically graded reality from the lowest level, i.e. the level of prima materia to its noblest level, is a unique truth with various connected levels which due to substantial movement transforms from one level to the other and from one lower level to the higher level.
- 3- By substance we intend the essence and existence of the object. Then, in substantial movement the existence of the object is moving not its essential substance. Then if we say that the essence of substance is exposed to substantial movement it is due to the existence not by its essence.
- 4- Movement is divided into two types of passage and medial movement. Substantial movement is the same passage type of movement. In passage view of movement the moving thing is identical in the beginning, in the middle and in the end of the movement (Puyan, 2009: 44~45).
- 5- There are numerous reasons that demonstrate the movement in substance: first, "causality of substance and effectuality accidents"; second, "what is accidental finally leads to what is essential"; third, "dependence of accidents upon the substance in existence and all their effects and rules"; fourth, "metamorphosis of the nature of accident to substance"; fifth, "evolutionary movement of essences"; sixth, "co-originality of cause and effect"; seventh, "position and disposition"; eighth, "determinateness of object by existence"; ninth, "reaching the end"; tenth, "relationship of the moving to the

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motionless"; Allameh Hassanzadeh Amoli has mentioned twenty one reasons for demonstration of substantial movement (2002, vol. 4: 6~7).

Relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection: movement occurs in the essence and the innermost nature of every object as well as in the natural form of man, i.e. body, which is continuously exposed to essential transformation, until the time when it becomes self-existent and needless of the matter; then, human body in one stage undergoes through movement and intensification and in another level it reaches the stage of needlessness to matter through essential transformation and is liberated from the previous generation and corruption. The unknown body which was the subject of movement will have no return and it is the perfect level of body - which is identical with the worldly body and if someone sees it confesses to their identity – has resurrection and enjoys all the perfections of the previous stages because every actual form contains previous forms and the moving object after reaching the end, enjoys all existing perfections in previous stages in the form of actualization of diversity in unity and in this case the otherworldly body reaches complete actuality from all respects and this body owns a form which is alive and perceiving and is competent to resurrect with the purgatorial form. Then, "body in the otherworld is the true extension of the worldly body and their difference just lies in the fact that body in the otherworld is essentially of life and perception while the worldly body is essentially dead and owes its life to soul (Ashtvani, 2002: 217~218).

2-3-5- Actualization of every combined entity with its form and last differentia:

Philosophers are divided on the typology of substances; Peripatetic philosophers believe in five substances that consist of:

- 1~ "Intellect" which does not have anything to do with material entities and is fully incorporeal and is even free from spatial and temporal aspects.
- 2- "Soul" which is essential incorporeal and needs matter in view of its action and depends on them.
- 3- "Body" which is associated with temporal and spatial aspects and its existence is demonstrated by reason and its manifestation can be seen in the form of accidents. Every physical substance [bodies] is composed of two other substances called "matter" and "form".
- 4- "Matter or hyle" which is indistinct and pure potentiality and exists in all heavenly and elemental bodies.
- 5- "Form" which represents the actual aspect of physical substances and has effects. Illuminationist philosophers did not accept matter or hyle and believed that physical form is one and the same with physical substance (Sheikh Ishraq, 1996, vol. 2: 74). Then, the quintuple substances as enumerated by peripatetic philosophers were reduced to three substances. However, they conceived another substance between the pure incorporeal and pure corporeal which is known as the ideal and purgatorial substance (Misbah Yazdi, 2009: 164-165). In physical substances which are composed of matter and form the question is that where does the thingy-ness of things lie and the criterion of the preservation of their truth is with the matter or the form. In response to it, the philosophers choose the second and say that the thingy-ness of a compound



thing is with its form (Avicenna, 1979: 166; Sabzewari, 2004: 407). Or in the words of Mulla Sadra:

- A- Every compound entity owes its identity to the form it has. For example, an animal's animality has its origin in its form, i.e. its soul, not in its body (Shirazi, 1981, vol. 9: 187: idem, 1982: 245-246).
- B- In "Al-Mabda va al-Maad" he says: actualization of every compound essence takes place by its last differentia and the realization and existence of every natural compound entity depends on its generic form (id, 1975: 382-383).
- C- In Zad al-Musafir he states: among matter and form what constitutes the truth and identity of one thing is its form (id, 2002: 18).

The realization of every compound entity depends on its last differentia and the rest of middle and remote differentia are among the external causes and conditions of it. By the same token, realization of every natural compound entity which has natural form depends on its generic form as well as the association of its matter with that form. It is due to the existential deficiency and weakness of natural compound entities that these compound entities cannot exist without the matter and all of them share an equal relation with the matter and form where the former is deficient while the latter is perfect and they are interdependent (Shirazi, 1981, vol. 9: 187). Then, if generic form could exist without matter in a particular sphere it will be certainly actualized and no deficiency will be found in it; because the matter of every object carries its essential truth and whenever an object reaches its perfection there will be no potentiality in it and it will need no matter. Then, a bed is a bed because of its form of bed-ness not due to the wood and nails used in it, and man is man thanks to his human form which is his rational soul not due to his body (id, 1975: 382-384 fidem, 2002: 23-24).

Relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection: having divided Sadra's principles into two groups of required necessary principles and occasional profitable principles, Sabzewari considers this principle to be among the required and necessary principles (id, 1981, vol. 9: 187, annotation no. 4). In his commentary of Manzumeh, Sabzewari uses this principle to demonstrate the identity of the worldly body and otherworldly bodies (Sabzewar, 1990, vol. 5: 331). Then, the involvement of this principle in corporeal resurrection is completely evident because matter enjoys potential aspect and it is the form which has actual state. Thus, body owes its identity to its generic form and the overall form of the body – which is known as personal form – is dependent upon the last differentia of man, i.e. rational soul. This personal form and rational soul of man which is always associated with human body in all his existential spheres – whether when the body has quantity or as the place of generic form or in otherworldly spheres where the body is the shadow of rational soul – human soul in all of its levels is in harmony with the body and for this reason human soul is a vegetative soul in one level and in another time it is animal soul and sometimes it is divine soul (Ashtyani, 2002: 219-221). Then, man in this world will be identical with the man in the otherworld because his form, i.e. rational soul, does not change in all spheres and remains the same.

2-3-6- Personal unity of existence:

Although this principle has not been mentioned in "Shawahid al-Rububyah", "Mafatih al-Gheyb" and "Zad al-Musafir", there are some traces of this issue in the discussions related to substantial movement and analogical gradation in the aforementioned works. Sabzewari has



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discussed this principle in *Asrar al-Hikam* in an independent form (1994) but in "Sharhi Manzumeh" he has referred to this principle in his discussion of principle of substantial movement (5: 336).

Personal unity of existence is discussed in *Asfar* as the sixth principle. Sadra states: personal unity which is identical with the existence of every object is not the same as the existence is so, then personal unity in the extended objects of quantity is the one and same with extension. The Governing Soul which perceives all sensory, imaginary and rational objects and is the agent of all natural, animal and human affairs due to its existential expansion can simultaneously involve in lowest sensory sphere and ascend to the sphere of the intellect and beyond (Shirazi, 2002: 189-190).

In our discussion of previous principles we said that determinateness is extensionally identical with existence and is united with it. Now we say that an analogically graded existence in every level of its levels is always a unique existence whose unity is identical with its existence; because unity is co-original with existence and co-originality is higher than equality as they refer to the same thing. It's a unique existent whose existence is one and same with its unity both in the highest level of existence and in the lowest level of hyle and mere potentiality. Human governing soul is the agent of all natural, animal and human actions that occur from a man and in every level it uses the relevant means available to it in the same level (id, 1981, vol. 9: 188-190; idem, 1975: 386-387). In other words, for soul due to its existential expansion there is a unity in diversity and diversity in its unity. This unity is the true unity that the soul owns in the same way that the Lord enjoys an originally true unity (id, 1981, vol. 1: 188-189, annotation 3; Al-Jami, 1980: 165-166). Among the examples that are offered as regards the unity of existence one can refer to the example of sea and waves and the example of light and colorful glasses (Feyz Kashani, 1996: 56; Amin, 1997: 32-35).

Relationship of this principle with corporeal resurrection: although Sabzewari considers this principle to be an important principle in demonstration of corporeal resurrection (id, 1981, vol. 1: 188-189, annotation 3) but he adopts two approaches as regards it. In *Asrar al-Hikam* he discusses this principle in an independent form (2004: 414) and in Sharhi Manzumeh he discusses it through his discussions of substantial movement (1990, vol. 5: 336). Then, one can explain this principle both along with the principle of analogical gradation and substantial movement and also in an independent form. Man in his life passes through various graded levels but he continues to retain his unity in all these levels. In other words, man in this world, purgatory and the other world is of the same identity even if we consider each level independently. This unity is identical with his existence. Then, man in the otherworld is the same man in this world without any difference and is unique and has a particular manifestation in every sphere and with a unique identity that exists in all levels.

CONCLUSION

Sadr al-Mutalihin of Shiraz as the founder of Transcendent Theosophy not only believes in spiritual and corporeal resurrection rather besides revelation based acceptance of corporeal resurrection he struggles to provide rational arguments for its demonstration. In such works as "Al-Mabda va al-Maad", "Asrar al-Ayat", "Zad al-Musafir", "Al-Asfar al-Arba", "Al-Arshyah", "Al-Shawahid al-Rububyah", "Tafsir al-Quran", "Al-Mazahir al-Elahyah" and "Sharhi al-



Hidayah al-Athiryah", Mulla Sadra has discussed the issue of resurrection and its corporeality; Sadra has made use of some principles and foundations in order to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Although the role of each one of these principles is different, some of them are of direct effect and some of indirect effect. However, one can divide them into ontological and anthropological groups. The anthropological principles consist of: role of human soul in the identity of body, incorporeality of imagination, role of soul in perceptual forms, realization of imaginary forms without the participation of matter, comprehensiveness of man as compared to three spheres and so on and so forth. The ontological principles consist of:

- 1- Primacy of existence: this principle grounds the foundations of Sadra's ontology and according to it, existence both in its worldly and otherworldly form is not more than one and the differences should be traced back to essences which are mentally posited.
- 2- Determinateness of existence suggests that the truth of every essence is its particular existence which is the primary principle but the specific features have their own origin in essential features.
- 3- Analogical gradation of existence implies that existence is a unique reality which has numerous levels and what makes this distinct is the same thing that brings them together. Then, there is a unity in diversity and diversity in unity. Man enjoys graded levels but his truth is not more than one.
- 4- Substantial movement suggests that movement does not merely occur in accidents rather the essence and nature of objects is moving. Human body has been moving and intensifying in one level and in another level it reaches the level of needlessness of matter via essential transformation and is liberated from generation and corruption.
- 5- The role of form and last differentia in the truth of every compound entity; the thingyness of a compound thing depends on its form. This form is personal and human rational soul which is associated with human body in all its existential levels and remains unchanged.
- 6- Personal unity of existence; the soul due to its existential expansion enjoys unity in diversity and diversity in unity and this is the shadowy true unity which is demonstrated for soul and accordingly it is unique in all its levels both in this world and the otherworld.

The ontological principles of Sadra play their role as the foundations of the anthropological principles. Sadra succeeded to demonstrate the corporeal resurrection through rational arguments and based on the relationship of soul and body he proved the rational necessity of corporeal resurrection and rationalized his belief based on religious sources. Thus, he contends that his rational understanding of corporeal resurrection has no historical background and no one has even mentioned it (Shirazi, 1984: 605; idem, 1981: 270; idem, 1987, vol. 6: 63). Of course, one should not forget that these principles are not able alone to demonstrate the corporeal resurrection and need anthropological principle which should be discussed in an independent essay. Through various discussions he argues that the resurrected man in the Doomsday is identical with the man who has died and once lived in this world (Shirazi, 2008: 85). Anyone who denies this issue is denying Shariah both from rational and traditional points of view (id, 1975: 37)



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