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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL GAPS ON THE DISCOURSE OF THE TENTH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN IRAN (2009)

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ABSTRACT

The tenth presidential election and protests against the election results also affected the upcoming elections. So that the discourse discussions of that period were evaluated as an analytical tool for Iranian electoral behavior by the political elites. In this way, the study of the context of discourses that were in conflict during the election could help find a way to reduce political antagonism and turning out the axis of violence into a dialogue-driven debate. In this study, by reviewing the structure of the discourses in the present Elections 2009 examined the context, the social gaps that were far from the election that shaped the conflict strategies between the representatives of fundamentalist and reformist discourses. The above study, described in the library method using the method of discourse analysis, Discourse strategies in discourse conflicts Rytat Laclau, Memphis, and in the description and interpretation of texts produced by representatives of discourse theory is enjoying Fairclough. In so doing, while referring to the discourses in the election, 2009, he examined the constituent elements of the discourse with emphasis on investigating the impact of social gaps on the formation of discourses. The study concluded in its findings that after-election events Should be evaluated in the production of the production of metaphorical reality in the context of the representational context of the discourse of society, when the representatives of the discourses at that time, by ignoring the gaps of the Iranian community, tried to block the dialogue and, using the tactics The antagonists of the deputies remove discourse readings.

Keywords: *Texture, Discourse, Social Split, Election, Representation, Hegemony, Antagonism.*

INTRODUCTION

Since 1996 years after the presidential election, Iranian society has taken the path of political development, and the underlying face of society in the transition from a populist society to a pluralistic society, from a power-dominated society to a society based on the power of law and the elite period Salary was focused on a period of democracy. In these years, the Iranian society has undergone fundamental changes due to social gaps, and social gaps have had a dramatic effect on political discourses and, consequently, electoral behavior of voters. A society that, in its underlying text, was shifted from a growing pluralism to the creation of various linguistic-discourse games. This situation continued while Iranian society was faced with discourse conflicts. Accordingly, recognizing the context in which these discourses are derived through the identification of social gaps could lead to more effective recognition of the conditions leading to the election outcome. Hence, in this paper, with emphasis on the recognition of the social fabric of the Iranian society in that particular position, which created the electoral discourse, it examines the events and gaps existing in that period. In this paper, Using the method of discourse analysis and theories of Laclau, Moff and Freckleh, written in response to the question of how

the impact of social gaps on the context shaping the electoral discourse controversy ۲۰۰۹ suggests that the intensification of the four major social divides in Iran (Generational, gender, ethnic, and religious divisions) by representatives of fundamentalist and reformist discourses, Esther

THEORETICAL

Discourse Texture Theories

In the analysis of textual approaches, Derwin (quoted in Tullay, Kozo, and Pitlinin, 1999) states that the term "texture" is less defined, and if defined, the definitions are varied and sometimes different. Curry and Savignan (2007) state that in the humanities, the meaning of texture is merely a factor in the text. When this idea is generalized to the field of discourse studies, it can be said that research by researchers in the field of discourse has two types of phenomena: discourse and texture. Therefore, according to a very general definition, texture means any context for discursive phenomena. The texture of all that is not an inherent part of discursive phenomena, nevertheless, is associated with them. Without texture, discursive phenomena lose their meaning. The texture description has more difficulties, because the tissues are not tangible, and one or more tissues may share some of the characteristics. Embedded tissue is intertwined with the objectivities that make up the discourse.

Common Approaches to Texture: An Objective Approach and an Interpretative Approach

Objective approach

This approach is more common in discourse studies. In this approach, texture is excited and described, but not in a philosophical and theoretical way. Social, cultural, personal, status and organization factors are considered as separate and distinct entities (independent and dependent variables) that restrict or motivate individual behavior in different ways. Textural entities in these approaches provide a framework for studying individual or group-specific information behavior, but not for the purpose of demonstrating how tissue knowledge works. The context here is referred to as an objective reality. In research-based approaches, textures are usually created by naming influential entities on the subject of research (actors, structures, and attributes). (Talja, Kozo and Pitlininen, 1999).

Interpretative approach

In this approach, tissue is considered not only as an independent entity, but also as the bearer of meaning. The tangible factors here are independent and distinct entities that have different effects on the subject of research, which is itself a constant and non-existent entity. In this approach, conceptualizations, or more precisely, are referential templates that incorporate certain types of entities (actors, structures, and attributes) into a researcher's perspective. These entities do not exist in the same way to be identified and described by the researcher, but textual entities in the researcher's social activity are formed in the same way as the subject of the research. In the interpretive approach, data are not regarded as direct descriptions of reality, but data represent the social reality that hegemonizes the discourse. From this point of view, observation and interviews like articles express the various textures of interaction and meaning, but none of the other is more valid or descriptive without intermediaries of reality, or less affected by linguistic or linguistic practices than others. (Silverman, 1985, quoted in Talja, Kozo and Petyalinen, 1999). In an interpretive approach, researches have focused on the meanings and values that individuals are aware of, the context for their discourse, and the types of



communication and information technologies that can be used as information tools (Talja, Kozo & Pitlinen, 1999)

1. The Effect of Social Splits on the Context of Discourse

From the author's point of view, discourses always appear in the context of social fabric. Discourses are time-consuming and needy. In the Iranian society, which, according to Dariush Shayegan, is a community of forty identities, these are the social divides that aggravate discursive rumors.

In other words, "discourse is now a concept that has different meanings. Discourse has been based on the meaning of concepts. In order to be able to provide a precise definition of the concept of discourse, we must in fact consider the concept of paleontology in the first half of the century. Searching for the twentieth place where Sausur referred to another rotating sign and looked at it in a different perspective. Sosor defined the sign as consisting of sounds, voices, gestures and physical movements, and so on. Saussure has a relationship between the slab and the signifier was considered to be the "optional" relation between human beings and / or human societies The key to this is the role of the slab as a key concept in this regard, the most important point about the "contractual" relationship between the slab and the model, or between the profile and the inline. In fact, these are the conventional structures of discourse that tell the reader that What does this sign mean? " (EMC Albert Scyl, 2012, 32)

From other perspectives, discourses in contracts, defined meanings, form the context of "text." Every concept must turn into an attractive text for its hegemony. A voice that has a sound from within to call human beings. People The thirst for a text is presented as a fact to them. It is intended to be a text, a sound or an element or a text and a text that is based on discourse. In other words, text constitutes a texture in discourses. Even if that concept is in the form of truth Comes in reality. In another sense, "the discourse is a kind of" social action "that plays a role in the production of the social world-including the knowledge of identities and social relations-as a consequence of the preservation of specific social patterns (Marianne Jorgensen, Luis Philips, 2010, 29)

2. The Effect of Myths on Discourse Context

In the words of the author of the research in the Iranian society whose myths originate from historical texts, and these texts form the reality of today, one must say how the whole sound of the texts can be conveyed to the whole society, which makes its text definite and so nervous Which exacerbates human forgetting that the text is translated only by the signs of dominant discourse.

According to Budyard, "reality" is real, but it must be proved "immoral" (Baudrillard ... {and others}, 1995, 182). The fact that Baudrillard speaks of it is the same as that in war The Persian Gulf of the Western media spoke of it. A reality of the genus. The reality of the proverbs, the fact that there is a twofold difference between the realities. A fact based on the myths that have become the hallmarks of today's discourses and the representatives of discourses Today, one day, they cast a discourse slab in the context of Islamic myths and they are hegemonic, and one day they are poured and formulated in ancient Iranian myths.

Hence, in order to study the constituent parts of the electoral discourse, we must analyze the discourses in context and in the dependence of history and in relation to the context of their historical context. An important issue here is the changes that occur at a particular time in the



language system. In other words, a narrative at a specific time and in the face of social gaps in the society in which discourse is formed can have different functions.

This means that when the words are entered into a discourse, their transparency becomes more transparent. But the art of the representatives of discourses is to use meanings from a discourse that is consistent with the context of the society. In other words, if the discourse If he wants to act as a socialist actress, he must shake the elements of his discourse so much that he does not disclose his musical instrument of discourse. For example, one of the strengths of the fundamentalist discourse in Election ۲۰۰۹ was the formulation of discursive slogans in plain language for all segments of society, so that vocabulary simplicity helped to understand all the strata. From this perspective, the accessibility of discursive slogans increased sharply. The slabs that were beautifully covered with Islamic-Iranian myths and the art of representing the fundamentalists were that the word-game vocabulary was somehow diverted into discursive strategies that, at the point of dispute between the slabs, had a relative superiority with the representative of the reformist discourse Had.

In a broad conceptual framework, in discourses, meanings are manifested in the point of view of humans, as if their definitive interests are in practical confirmation of discursive propositions. Conversations stimulate people to make meaningful and sacred things. They are so glazed as the colored paper, as if the published meanings are revelations. Contentions produce meanings. After turning the device into language games, it is presented as a beautiful smalcan. It introduces itself from the descendants of the ancients as if they were borrowed from prophets who, because of the discourse produced by the blood The people, in fact, without any knowledge of themselves, are in the midst of discursive structures. People, by their hesitation in a crazed greed, are captured as such by Baudrillardists who, at the historical milestones, endeavor to have humans in that pure moment. It does not become a subject, therefore, in a war that the arms of the two sides are myths, they are trying to make objects that in the future they would "demand" them from the interests. Prophecies of the kind. In other words, we must admit at some point in time, discourses make the demands of society's texture so tense and, in the same vein, It activates political phenomena in order to bring promises and ideas into line with the context of society. It will be the driving of discourse when the media is one of the pillars of power. From this perspective, human beings will not be human and will be instrumental. That sacredness and dignity would be used as the engine of personal manners. By this assumption, a person is considered as representing the whole discourse, and the context of the community will be the same as its coordinates.

In this regard, we need to give more explanation. In the third world, we face mosaic systems. In the sense that we observe that in a country that has revolutionized postmodern methods, its political system is based on modern and pre-modern thought. In this regard, Lyotard is threatened by systems that have the ability to reduce everything to their advantage. The point here is that such systems employ all the means of removal and, with postmodernist methods, all the context of society with this same in other words, the criterion is the structure of the discourse through the formal platforms of sovereignty.

But it is simplistic to imagine that all components of the society have been aligning themselves with the dimensions of the dominant discourse. In the meantime, those who are resistant to the skin of the society, with the help of informal media and social networks, communicate with each other. And rebuilds their identities. Resilient themes are a term that is one of the components of



society that expects the dominant discourse to lose the power of reducing everything in its own right. It will only occur when a dominant discourse suffers a stroke Identity. In other words, it will lose its ability to identify the floating elements, the discourse of its discourse will slowly diminish. Sometimes, discourses will lose their own backs, and once they have their umbrellas so small that they themselves are in danger of being destroyed, it will happen when the processes of removal and the continuation continue. Which does not remain the dominant discourse tree, except for a tiny wooden trunk. This moment, it will drown a discourse.

Discourses are mainly "controlled, organized, and structured, intentional activity in the context of the community." The context refers to a particular context of the context or context of discourse. The discourses publish in the context of the context. Speeches for hegemony in the context of the society, we must be well aware of the social attributes of the society and to attract the signs in our discursive system, which are accepted by the social attributes.

Social gaps, which include gender, age, class, education, social status, ethnicity, are among the characteristics that are often relevant to discourse historiography. Institutional textures include specific tools and objects such as uniforms, flags, special tool furniture (such as checkers of judges), etc., which are important in official speech or writing.

"Texture can not be included in the form of structural elements of the same level of discourse as in other actions, but should be defined at a higher level, that is, the level of the totality of the situation or event. The tissues are flexible and variable. Contexts of discourse contexts, but the very discourse itself affects the context and makes it." (Van Dyke (and other), 2011. 98) The texture is from a perspective created by events that are the result of social splits. Indeed, what is emerging in the context of discourse is the result of actions through social cleavages has taken

3. The Relationship between Social Splits and Discourse

The concept of "gap" in contemporary political sociology has generally been used to refer to the distinctions and persistence differences that have been observed during the electoral campaign and the conduct of voting. (Manaza Brooks, P.31)

Monza and Brooks, in one of the latest studies based on the concept of social gaps, have borrowed from the trilogy of Bartolini and Mayer to analyze the presidential election in America. They describe the three levels as follows:

1) Social construction: Social gaps are rooted in the social fabric of a given society. Since social construction is slowly changing, social gaps will also be durable in the event of a stable social fabric. Intra-social segments create groups of people whose interests and have a shared status. Changes in social construction can change the size and composition of social gaps. For example, if the share of voters in the working class is reduced, the overall impact of class divisions on political alliances may also be reduced, even if the electoral behavior of those who are still in the working class has not changed. By contrast, the working class may change in terms of its internal composition and, consequently, its political commitments will be transformed.

2) Conflict and Group Identity: This level, field, and field are the emergence of previous level gaps. It is in this field that members of the groups define themselves in conflict with others. Group auditing is a prerequisite for converting the divisions of social construction into social divisions. Body of recognition of group territories, social inequalities and the possibility of emergence in political conflicts, institutional and organizational levels Will not have.

3) Major political conflicts: This level represents the third condition for the emergence of a social gap. Because political parties or social movements that represent this level are obviously the



result of social contention and are tools for mobilizing sections of the population for political action.

In this way, Monza and Brooks also believe that the existence of components of all three levels is necessary to create a full-blown social gap. On the other hand, in order to understand the impact of social gaps on the patterns of voters supporting certain parties, all three levels of gaps should be considered as a social divide.

The good three-level pattern of Bartolini and Meyer, and Minza and Brooks, is that, in addition to opening a broader perspective on the slots, it can also explain their recession and decline. Based on this three-level model, Minza and Brooks for this Claimed that social gaps have lost their significance, they cite three potential sources: (1) the decline of social constructive inequalities, including class inequalities; (2) the rejection of conflict patterns and group identification (-the second-level components), and (3) and ultimately The fact that the third-level components, that is, political-organizational and institutional factors, are causing decline The importance of the slots has been taken. Manza and Brooks implicitly confirm this and say that the major parties are understandably sympathetic to each other in terms of the pattern of meeting the demands of the class of voters. Because their goal is to use political parables and metaphors and create The ambiguity of the majority of voters with common and potential economic interests.

Explaining the Context of Electoral Disputes in the Year of 2009

From the 1970s onwards, Iranian society became a good platform for growing gaps and faces, and a kind of dream of different planting and seedlings. From traditional to modern society, from a revolutionary discourse to a reformist discourse, from hardware threats to software threats, from politics to culture, from clear positions to opaque positions, from one another to another, from the challenge of political competition to political hatred, from discourse to violence, from stability to change, from the information world to the world, and ultimately from ideology to discourse. From this point of view, with this introduction, we must consider elections 2009 as the confrontation between tradition and modernity when the subject Those who sought political development were opposed to the representative of the discourse seeking the stability of the current situation, they did not have the option of using symbolic violence, and using media tools and strategies to create fears of a lack of economic and political security, The naked power is used to save the society from a discourse that seeks a lack of security and stability and produces political turmoil. But what was the gap in the 2009 year of the conflict, where all forms of violence and antagonism replaced the hegemonic authority of both sides of the conflict?

In the words of the author of the research, and the validity of the research carried out by the political elites in Iran, the gaps of the Iranian society are: the gap between tradition and modernity, the gap between sovereignty and the interior, the gap between the inland and the other, the gap between the poor and the poor, the gap between the religion, the gap between plurality The unity between the dominant society and the civil society, the gap between the official government actors, the gap between the political elites, the gap between the social system and the political system, on the one hand, national media rely on On highlighting these gaps, the elite boundaries and, consequently, the masses toward Discourse chaos and highlighting the security threat caused by the dominant antithesis of hegemony have attempted to create a systematic and polar classification in the context of the community and, on the other hand, foreign media have attempted to formulate, using a vacuum of information inside. The



fundamental demands in the cover letter are electoral claims. Hence, the delineation of these gaps in the context of the bipolar society of Ahmadinejad and Mousavi's supporters as the main representatives of the fundamentalist and conscientious discourse was formed. The findings of this study, which are not available but available, indicate that in each of the 2009 elections, each of the four final candidates for the election has been represented as a political discourse, and on this basis, they are presenting symbols, signs and The elements of their discourse.

Discourse in the tenth election

After reviewing the reformist discourse represented by Mir Hossein Mousavi, we have reviewed the key words and concepts Mousavi emphasizes in these texts: simple biology-companionship with the poor-escape from world-progress-development-sophie - Ethics-Justice-Freedom-Rationality-Reformism-Principle-Privatization-Unity-Discourse of the Islamic Revolution-Rare Resources-Wisdom-Multi-Voice-Basic Rights-Ethical Birth-Civil Society-Creating Transparency in Society-Uses Of opportunities and facilities-preserving the dignity of the people of Iran.

On the other hand, Mehdi Karroubi, after failing in the year 2005, launched a decentralized approach by 2009 and proceeded to codize the publication of the reformist discourse. Through his written media, the Etimadlami newspaper, he urged the development of reformist discourse Kaboubi portrays people's dash as a top sign and articulate signs of liberty, pluralism, pragmatism, legality, gender equality, religious tolerance, national dignity, and pure Islamic Islam. Mohsen Reza'i in his reading from fundamentalist discourse, in order to obstruct the signs of justice; economic, political, scientific, and cultural justice in a relationship. Razi articulated with the sign of "universal justice." In his remarks, he articulated the "coalition government" superiority with elements of political justice, economic justice, scientific justice, cultural justice, and tribal justice, and from this to the period of pragmatism in Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, reviewing the performance of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from ۲۰۰۵ to 2009 represents a supreme support of the principals of fundamentalist discourse. He added that in the year 2005, between Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the metaphorical space of those days in the fundamentalist media, he opposed the discourse of justice and the discourse of artistic representation. The scope of this metaphorical space was reproduced by presidential media during the presidency of Ahmadinejad.

In contrast to the year ۲۰۰۵, Ahmadinejad, in contrast to the year 2005, chose the Dalal Valley as the preferred sign of justice rather than focusing on justice. As a result of this change, the signs of the nation, the Islamic state, service, justice, material and spiritual advancement, purity, Articulation of the oppressed, courage, national self-confidence, national dignity, resistance to rights, revolutionary idealism, classless society, statelessness, national identity, values of the revolution with the Dalal province. Ahmadinejad cites the name of the nation with the concept of state, the position of the president and God made an equal correlation and authenticated this relationship within the conceptual framework of a gospel. These conditions created a metaphorical atmosphere in 2009, when discursive disputes gradually became violent and obstructed post-election paths. After the end of the election, representatives of the reformist discourse objected to the election result and the violations committed by the antagonistic approach of dominant discourse. Became The protest against the election result turned into a defeat of discourse. The electoral mechanism was indispensable and the outcome of the election became immortal. Signs of the fundamentalist discourse that won the election were threatened by reformist discourse in such a way that some of the signs were subjected to semantic



representations by rival discourse and were in the domain of reformist discourse. The lack of persuasion of supporters of reformist discourse and the replacement of violent threats and the principle of centralization and humiliation by the fundamentalist discourse turned the opportunity to participate in the election into a legitimate crisis, and all forms of peaceful struggle between representatives of reformist and fundamentalist discourses were blocked.

Ahmadinejad's reportage, presented in the 2009 election by a media-sponsored discourse under the dominant discourse and in his discourse, was not able to fully represent the results of the election the next day. This lack of objectivity should be seen in the failure to consolidate the meaning of the discourse minutes during the conflict. With rival discourse. When this lack of objectivity, the identity of the resistance came to the street, where there were objects that now turn out to be headless subjects in the direction of a movement, they have a referendum in the context of their street ranks to display.

In this way, we see that victorious discourse, which must be the driver of the crisis, itself becomes the source of the crisis, the dominant elites who must play the role of a position, see their exclusion and exclusion.

In this regard, it is important to examine the gaps in the discourse context of the 2009 election:

1. The Streets' gap is an expression of an inconsistency in ideologies and aspirations of various social groups. Disconnection between unity and existentialism are among these types of gaps.
2. Behavioral gap: indicates an inconsistency in the behavioral patterns of behavior among different social groups and groups. The difference in political behaviors among private sector employees and public sector employees is an example of these types of gaps.

"Other scholars have divided social cleavages into two types of active and inactive. According to them, the social gap becomes active when based on groupings and political action and political action. Social disruptions become active when based on We should see new queues among political forces in society. The transition from the inactive gap situation involves complex processes, which are usually discussed in the context of "social mobilization", two situations can be imagined in this regard. The gap Which is currently inactive and may be active in the future, and the second split that was active in the past and L have lost their effectiveness." (Tajik, 2002, 266)

The Impact of Political Splits on the Context of Active Political Discourses in 2009

Hossein Bashirieh divided political parties and political forces into four groups during the early post-revolutionary years: 1. Right-wing religious parties and groups 2. Parties and radical religious groups 3. Liberal-democratic parties 4-Social-affiliated parties and groups (Bashiria, 2005: 27) Thus, in the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, both the fundamentalist and reformist discourse was at the beginning of the revolution. But it was necessary to examine the roots of this dualism during the constitutional era. The history of this period shows that the dual constitutional-secularism, which during the period Constitutionalism is of particular importance, because when it comes to the political thought of Iran with modernity, two major trends emerged.

Another approach to this issue is an approach that has been called to polishness and based on which modern concepts can not be justified by Iranian culture and religion. This duality has continued throughout history in the last century, but it can not be said in a precise manner that the two are the same two political movements that became known as fundamentalism and



reformation during the Islamic Revolution, and not that reformism and Principledism is totally alien to this duality and is not related to it. On the one hand, the reformist movement is very similar to the constitutional movement, and the principled movement is similar to the constitutional movement. On the other hand, the reformist movement is different from the constitutional movement during the constitutional era because constitutionalism during the constitutional era was merely to restrict power. But reformists have other demands during the Islamic Revolution. And on the other hand, not all legitimate, principledists necessarily want to be constitutionalists, and they are different. "The Islamic Revolutionary Dialogue, crystallized in the form of the political system of the Islamic Republic, was the result of the articulation of the two important signs of republicanism and Islamism. In the view of Soltani Islam, the central denomination of Islamic groups of tradition It was oriented to gather the signs of the clergy, jurisprudence, and jurisprudent together in a discourse. On the other hand, the signs of the people, the law, and freedom were articulated in the secular-liberalist modernist discourse around the central hollow of the republic. Saltany spoke of the term "metaphorical space" Laclau uses the arrangement of two discourses of tradition and revival in the shadow The metaphorical space of the Islamic Revolution discourse analyzes the charismatic character of Ayatollah Khomeini.

These different political forces, with very diverse goals and interests, gather together under two umbrellas for two main reasons. The first reason why the cosmopolitan atmosphere is arrogant is the second most important reason for the charismatic personality of Ayatollah Khomeini "(Soltani, 2005: 14 -39). But after some time, the metaphorical space of expression was revealed through conflicts and contradictions. "Since all the above-mentioned groups of Pahlavism were eliminated, gaps and contradictions were activated in the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, and the struggle between the sub-dialects an activist within the revolutionary discourse began to achieve hegemony. But in this way, traditionalist discourses, secular, and discourse discourse in general, one can speak of two main tendencies within the structure of power during the 1960s, which became known as the traditional and traditional Left. Under the second trend, the positions of the majority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in these years (the Third House) were sympathizers' Private property, the lack of state intervention in the economy, and the lack of control of domestic and foreign trade. In contrast, the second tendency was of Islamic type, land reform, militancy, and government intervention in the economy. "(Bashiria, 2005: 82). "With the end of the war and the passing of the leadership of the system and the rule of charisma in the form of the Velayat-e Faqih, the background to the emergence of contradictions emerged. After the end of the war, building discourse, based on the progress and development, opens a new chapter in the structure of the official discourse and offers a moral-rational model with values such as carotelius and production. "(Kashi, 2000: 368). But for some reason, such as the ineffectiveness of the charming construction discourse According to Soltani, "the reformist discourse forms the core of the people alongside the slogans of civil society, law, political development, and freedom," he added. In contrast, in the fundamentalist discourse, the signs of justice, economic development, clergy, values, and cultural invasion around Merck They were articulated in the province. "(Soltani, 2004: 155).

"Khatami's reformist discourse, due to the constraints imposed by the law, could not go beyond the political discourse of Islam, the main institutions of legislation in Iran is to the clerics and conservative institutions. There is always a kind of pessimism among conservative legislatures



(Hosseini Zadeh, 2008, 439- 438). Conservatives who were rejected by the previous government used the social conditions of the time and assessed the reform process unnecessarily for the Iranian society, and The people's problems were considered economically and livelihood, and also with hardware tools such as AH Onon, and the removal of some politicians provided the grounds for the exclusion of reformists and the opportunity for conservatives.

In 2002, the council elections provided the ground for the emergence of a conservative discourse, and assessed their social authority by serving and improving people's livelihoods and the main issue of the social conditions of the time as a non-economic status. This new compilation of discourse was based on the radical political Islam of the Imam era and the traditional Iranian conservative thoughts, and more than the intellectual and theoretical one, was based on the political experience and the pragmatism of a group of middle-ranking leaders of the system. Disregard for the humanities, self-confidence in the face of the global system, popularism along with the traditional paternalistic Iranian conservatism, the emphasis on leadership and velayat-e faqih, and Islamic values are among the most important signs of this discourse. “(Hosseini Zadeh, 2008: 443-444). The main slogans of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as a recital of the fundamentalist discourse, turned away from these issues in the election campaign: fighting poverty, corruption and discrimination, serving honestly people, building confidence in the world, expanding ties With Islamic countries, the development of a citizenship program and the fight against urban marginalization and land degradation in the metropolitan area, the provision of services To reduce the gap between the government and the nation, to form meetings of the government in the provinces, and to bring ministers to remote areas in a collective way, to solve the problems of the people, to bring the money to the people at the table and to end the war on poverty and richness (the same)

Ahmadinejad's recitation of principledism, about concepts such as justice, the central religion, the return to Islamic values and the Islamic revolution, and the emphasis on Islamic state, regards religious democracy as a democracy, and regarding Velayat-e Faqih, led by the past and the revolution, and Islam speaks in its electoral campaign, and criticizes previous governments, assesses the political and economic scene that was ineffective over the past 16 years and accused previous governments of being unplanned.

We must accept that dominant discourses are always struggling with crises. The fears that cause festering, and the hegemonic composition weaken and weaken. Achilles' heels are discourses. (Caseray, 353: 2009). The experience of eight years of governing the reformist There were no different crises. Reformation, in addition to gaining gains in political development, faced barriers and problems. Part of these problems arose from altering this discourse with its rival discourse of fundamentalism. Forty-year-old fundamentalists who, from the beginning, were unhappy with the work of the reformists, were struggling to reform the reformists over the course of eight years, this discourse breaks down. In this way, using the brilliant illustrations of the weaknesses of the reformists, they presented problems to the people in such a way that the scope of the reformist discourse was so open that its discursive minutes gradually turned into floating signs that rival discourse By defining a different reading of these signs, the project of blocking meaning through Re The well-executed rigors of reformist discourse at the semantic level created a fundamental vacuum at the semantic level and stimulated fundamentalist discourse to enter the realm of power. A revelation of the metaphorical space in society against reform. The clerics, led by conservatives in different times, such as the Karbaschi court, chain killings, the seizure of the



press and the campus, led the reform to a margin that, at the end of the reform period, triggered the people's tendency toward Ahmadinejad's recitation. (Soltani B, 2005: 249). Ahmadinejad is a representative of the Supreme Court in the first period of presidency, the representative of the Abadgaran party was right-wing parties, and in the second term in 2009, he enjoyed the maximum protection of conscientiousness.

In a more explicit statement, we can explain the effect of social discourse on the context of the discourses in the 2009 elections as follows: The changing taste of literate people in an evolving society changes their perceptions of social, political, and cultural issues, The social rights and the new principles of social life. The literate people, while having more independent autonomy, value more to participate in social life, more generally, with a critical view of things.

Among the existing social gaps in Iranian society, in structural split, generation and gender, and in the random, ethnic, and religious divisions, are selected for consideration. Studies show that over the last decade, these four social gaps have been of great importance in Iran.

Generation gap

There is a serious controversy among the scholars and scholars in this regard regarding the use or non-use of the "slit" attribute to the generational relations in Iran and the active or dormant social gap. On the basis of this, some scholars and scholars consider the 6% difference between the two generations' mean scores to be "wide and deep divisions," while others have noted the difference between them as "natural differences" among different generations. (Chitz maker, 2007, p. 103). In sum, theories about generational relations in Iran can be divided into three categories:

The first group, those who talked about "generation failure" and referred to the split between generations and modernity, the gap between tradition and modernity, the Islamic revolution, and the ineffectiveness of the state as three main factors of cultural divide and generation in Iran (Ghaderi, 2003, pp. 82-81). With the roots of a generation gap in facing Iran with modernity, society is subject to a generation breach (Aghajari, 2003, p. 161). With the historical reference of the generation gap before the revolution, revolutionary changes and sudden changes have been considered as intergenerational disruptions (Tavasoli, 2003, p. 243).

The second category is those who consider the "generation gap" in the country. Referring to the growth of the young population of the country and cultural changes, it has been acknowledged that the Iranian society has been divided into generations, not generation decay (Abdollahian, 2003, p. 258). In a research study of the values of fathers and boys, it has been concluded that the generational gap has existed as a general phenomenon in society (Timurid, 1998, p. 63).

Third, researchers who believe in the absence of a generation gap in the country. In his research, Jalili concludes that there is essentially no gap between generations in Iran, which is a small disagreement that naturally exists in all societies (Jalili, 1999, p. 71). Tavakoli also studies the values of mothers and girls to the conclusion that the observed differences are not significant (Tavakoli, 2003, p. 376)

Studies show that although there are some differences between the young and old generation of the country, there is no significant difference between the generational gap in terms of value, attitude, cultural, intellectual and behavioral as a social active divide in the country.

Religious dimension:

In most of the researches (which are based on statistical measurements), we see that although the younger generation's religious beliefs and beliefs are not diminished, the religious aspect of



the community is not much welcomed, and some kind of youth is a personal religion. Have turned.

In articles and scholarship, religion or religious affiliation has two basic dimensions of beliefs, deeds and rituals (Ronger, 1985, p. 60; Al-Manawi, 1996, p. 20). In most of the researches, there are significant differences between the There is a new and old generation that can be talked about in the generational gap. In other words, in this dimension, although the previous generation has a widespread participation in religious social practices, the younger generation does not have much trouble in rituals such as Friday prayers and prayers (Ebrahimi 2010, p. 174).

A review of the discourse in the 2009 election indicates that in March 2009, a pamphlet entitled "The Biosphere Pattern" was published by the representatives of the fundamentalist discourse as Mir Hossein Mousavi's ideology of de-socialization, and was given in lectures. However, after that, Sayyed AliReza Hosseini Beheshti of Mousavi's advisers considered the publication of this pamphlet in 2008, which was publicly written by a group of scholars and in the pathology of the revolution. But publishing the full text showed that the reformist discourse, by carefully examining the religious gaps in the field of pathology, suggested ways of reforming religiosity in Iranian society.

Investigating Hijab as One of the Indicators of Religiosity It is important to note that the tendency to cover and chastity is an innate tendency among men and women. But its size and shape are directly related to the ethics and culture of societies. (Center for Thinking and Cultural Observation, 2010, p. 17) It seems that in the seventies, among the younger generation, there has been a move towards a change in the type of cover. In fact, while the older generation was more likely to see the tent cover, the current generation tends to use Mantoua more than anything else. It seems that along with this change, the type of apparent cover, metamorphosis Belief in the practice of hijab has been made, and younger women tend to respect Islamic laws regarding hijab and their relationship with others.

Hence, by examining the campaign of representatives of the electoral discourse in 2009, we are witnessing the presence of young people with a different veil. What upgraded this gap in 2009 was not the appearance of hijab, but the optional or mandatory hijab. An indication that has led to the demonstration of this discourse slab because of the extensive activity of patrols of guidance since ۲۰۰۰-2009.

Social dimension:

The findings of various researches show that the feeling of social justice in Iranian society is lower (below 50%), but there is not a significant difference between the attitudes of young people with middle and large adults (difference of attitudes between 1 and 9%). The level of social trust in the Iranian society is generally low, but the level of general distrust among the youth is higher than that of adults and adults (5 to 6 percent). The remarkable thing is that young people's trust in Internet and satellite news There was more than national media (53 to 44 percent). The total public participation of individuals in the form of political and civil society organizations and organizations is a total of 20% to 30%, with the participation spectrum of at least 3% (participation in political parties and organizations) to 38% (participation in religious groups) in Swing

Political dimension:



According to the results, most social surveys at macro level, people's attitudes toward the "legitimacy of the principle of the system" are positive, but the efficiency of the government in the economic and political sectors is not so favorable to the people. Based on the results, the degree of dissatisfaction with the political situation in the country and the advent of changes in the political system among young people is far more than middle-aged.

Cultural dimension: The general attitude of the society towards the cultural dimensions of unity and national solidarity is positive and satisfactory and there is no significant difference between the attitude of young people with middle and large adults in this regard. Despite the development of Internet sites and access to satellite networks, and despite the fact that youth are one of the most important and main audience and users of these media, the influence of these media on the minds and attitudes of young people to the dimensions and components of unity and National solidarity is not so much and notable.

In a general conclusion, the generational gap is a concept that emphasizes psychological, social, and cultural differences, and a significant difference in perception, beliefs, expectations, and values of behavioral meanings between simultaneous don'ts in a society. In the 2009 election, the representatives of the discourse, by establishing an equivalence relation between their discourse slogans as the main source of dominant discourse that came from the 57th Revolution in Iran, tried to represent the contradiction in the reading of the ideals of the 57th revolution. The arguments advanced by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi as representatives of the reformist discourse had a significant difference with Ahmadinejad's and Mohsen Rezaie's recitations as representatives of fundamentalist discourse. Hence, the generational gap factor has had a significant impact on the discursive context created by the parties.

gender gap

In analyzing the gender gap in Iran, indicators related to the status of women in society (such as health, education, political participation, employment, etc.) have been studied by researchers. The results show that during the last two decades, the status of Iranian women has improved considerably in various aspects of life, but there are still some inequalities in some areas. There is also a kind of "feeling of discrimination" among Iranian women, which in addition to the real inequalities that underlie some gender conflicts in the country. Studies have shown that the gender gap is not an active gap in Iranian society, but Iranian women believe that their enjoyment of citizenship rights is not optimal and that their enjoyment of citizenship rights is above the average of a low-income society. Therefore, it can be said that gender conflicts in Iranian society is seen as rooted in the sense that women are deprived of some citizenship rights. Analysis of the findings of the researches and ethnical studies in Iran shows that there is no conflict between ethnic identity and national identity in Iran. In addition to special cases in all ethnic groups of the country, with increasing the amount and severity of ethnic identity, national identity is increased or at least Undefined. In other words, more research findings show that ethnic and national identities are "synergistic" in many cases. Relationships based on cooperation on conflicts and hostilities based on conflict between the various ethnic groups of Iran (Turk, Kurds, Lars, Arabs, Fars, Baluch, etc.) are very influential. This has a positive effect on the formation and strengthening of national identity. Has had a great deal.

The results of the 2009 election results show that, apart from Western Azerbaijan, in all the provinces where the Azeris are present, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been more representative



of the radical discourse than Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi as the representative of the reformist discourse. Where Mousavi is from the Azeri language, one of the challenging issues after the election and protesting its results was the ethnic divide that Azeri did not vote for Mir Hossein Mousavi. This issue was raised there as one of the reasons for the victimization of the election, which Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife mentioned in a media interview.

The people of Kurdistan, as one of the great tribes of Iran, live mostly in the west of the country and in the provinces of Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Lorestan, Hamedan and Kermanshah. A survey of statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior in 2009 shows that the representatives of the fundamentalist discourse in Kurdistan province with a small margin of reformist representation have won the majority of votes. But this gap is more visible in Kermanshah province.

Most of the Baluchis in the southeastern part of the country reside in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan. The people of Sistan and Baluchistan province are Muslims. In the northern parts of the province, the Sistan (Persian language) is centered on Shiite Zabul, but in the southern part, under the title Balochistan and the majority of the province's population are Baluchi Sunni speakers of the Hanafi sect. The results of the 2009 election polls show that both representatives of the reformist discourse against the representatives The majority of fundamentalist discourses have been voiced. Among the reasons for this difference, in addition to doubt, Ethnicity that prompts ethnic demands has also dominated the hegemony of Sunni demands in the province. In other words, factors such as relative deprivation, unequal distribution of resources and facilities, and the impact of ethnic elites have led voters to more likely to find candidates. Who represented the reformist discourse. In this respect, texture matching with the text of the discourse in this province has been maximally matched.

From the cities of Khuzestan, where the Arabs live in them, one can mention Ahwaz, Susangerd, Shush, Abadan, Khoramshahr and Shadegan. The final results of the 2009 election results indicate that Mohsen Reza'i, who has a majority ethnicity in Khuzestan province, is outspoken over Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a representative of the fundamentalist discourse. Hence, one of the points that Mohsen Rezaei and his campaign during the post-election protests emphasized was the reference to ethnic voter dependencies in Khuzestan and the Locale's inhabitants, which was expected to have a different election behavior than what happened to have.

Religious gap

Analysis and explanation of the religious divide in the country was one of the difficulties in carrying out this study, because in most of the social researches and surveys, the variable of religion is not included. Also, the density of religious and ethnic divisions in the age groups of society (Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Golestan) made it more difficult to distinguish between ethnic and religious data. For this reason, based on data that indirectly implied understanding of the attitudes of the Sunni fellow countrymen, attempts were made to analyze the religious divide in the country. The results show that the religious divide is not an active social gap in the country, and the frustration of the Sunni fellow countrymen mainly focuses on the "deprivation" or "deprivation" of this section of society from political, social, cultural and economic rights. In the attitude of Sunni fellow countrymen, the indices of national unity and solidarity have been evaluated and analyzed, which are referred to as the most important ones. There is not much difference between the attitudes of the Sunnis and the Shiites about the different dimensions of religiosity and religious identity, although the results of some studies



indicate that in the religious and behavioral dimension, the extent of the adherence of Shiites to the religious obligations of the Sunnis is greater.

Sunnis' attitude to the existence of social justice in the country is far worse than other fellow citizens. The findings show that the Sunnis' fellow countrymen in terms of enjoying opportunities and economic facilities are more inferior to other sectors of society. Based on the results of the research, despite the high membership of Sunni national identity, his attitude to the government and its economic and political performance is not very positive.

Cultural gap

One of the most prominent indicators that explains the intergenerational difference in the field of culture is consumption and lifestyle. The lifestyle is things like fashion, attitudes, values and behaviors that work to differentiate between individuals and others. Future styles can be defined as normative attitudes related to consumption. In other words, the culture of consumption of people in the community is based on the values, tastes and beliefs of the people.

One of the most important ways in which lifestyle is mentioned is to emphasize a cultural model based on signs, representations and media. The lifestyle of a particular narrative that a person has for identity. It is a person who chooses, confides himself with others and requires daily decisions about how to cover, feed, work and leisure, and how to shape people.

In this regard, the representatives of the reformist discourse emphasized the choice of being a lifestyle of lifestyle, but the representatives of the fundamentalist discourse emphasizing the Islamic lifestyle and defining its framework by the Shari'a led to the formation of a kind of discursive agonism in the electoral debate. Among the objectified metaphors of this section Discourse Agonism, the contest of candidates in the use of satellite equipment, as well as the lifestyle of the aristocracy and the style of life of the oppressed. This kind of struggle in its essence represented a kind of contrast between computationalism and the emphasis on rationality against populism and on the basis of apparent values, a concrete example of which was in the debate between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad on the criteria for determining the price of goods, Ahmadinejad buying from the butchers Assessed around your location as a low price measure for your goods.

The lack of consistent and fair coverage of news and events has reduced the credibility of national media and increased the credibility of social networks and satellite TVs. This approach ultimately led to an intensification of discursive disputes and discursive agonism to antagonism. In a macro analysis, gaps are very important variables in political transformations, and if they are accurate, accurate, and quick, they can easily be used instead of looking at their threats. In a society with strong political institutions, a strong inter-state and people (parties, syndicates, etc.) and the community community's agreement on values, political processes more often take place within the framework of peaceful participatory political processes, and the gaps, if activated in such a society, are less willing to radical change, but in societies with weak political institutions, if gaps in society become active, they lead to violence, demonstrations and disobedience. Civilian needs. The plurality of social gaps leads to internal political instability and reduces the chances of sharing among groups in the community. Under such circumstances, the bargaining power of the Hanseatic Group is less likely to be made, and the likelihood of the rival groups Hostility and violent conflict. In many instances, ethnic, religious, regional, economic, and ... gaps have been matched up and differences have been added.



In fact, some of the gaps in the game are compounded by the sum of algebraic aggregates that are most economic gaps, while the identity and ideological gaps in the game are zero-summed and may lead to violent partnerships that can even lead to Challenging the political system. In other words, generational and ideological gaps cause the legitimacy of the government to be questioned, and another legitimacy appears against the political system.

In post-election protests in 2009, Iranian opposition-backed media abroad were attempting to exploit the potential of the protesters to electoral protests that organized their protests in the framework of the law to bring them up against the integrity of the system. Due to the presence of inflammation and the lack of recognition of the protesters' faces, these media were able to organize protest movements in the absence of a coherent crisis management and, in the context of the crisis of accountability, taking advantage of social gaps in Iran. As time went on, the protest body's goals were far from the goals of the early elites of the protests and it was not possible to lead the next gatherings due to the separation of the body from the top. Although the protesting elites simply endorse the election, they protested as an instrument for reviewing election violations. But post-election action and street violence, which came from outside the discretion of dissenting members to the outcome of the election, removed the context of the discourse from the text and separated the anarchist elements into discourse conflicts, resulting in a more discursive texture and influenced by generations and beliefs toward antagonism and rejection. Violent violence was driven by the sovereign institutions.

CONCLUSION

In one conclusion, we must describe the context of the discourses in the 2009 election. Ahmadinejad was able to create, by creating a metaphorical environment, his plans to improve the conditions of the Iranian society. In a situation where people were struggling with difficult economic conditions and seeking to improve their own status, in this metaphorical context, they found their lost ideals in this discourse, and because of talking about reform and political development for The hard-lived people were no longer attractive and did not produce meaning; they were able to absorb the majority of the poor and middle class people. Fundamentalist discourse with the idea of justice superiority condemned them to injustice in the conscious society, tried to articulate their discourse alongside the supreme justice juggernaut, and on the other hand, by breaking the structure of economic and political development from previous governments, tried to The restoration of its discourse brought about, serving, poverty alleviation, charity, job creation, and the elimination of unemployment, along with the central center of justice.

In contrast to Mousavi, his discourse slogans, such as freedom, truth, freedom of thought, pluristic citizenship rights, and nationalism, centered around rival discourse around the mainstream of the people. The focus of the reformist discourse was on the foundations of discourse Rival to economic and foreign policy issues. From this point of view, Ahmadinejad, as a point of contact with the fundamentalist groups in this election, concentrated his work over the past four years on his foolish debates around the government's weaknesses in the reformist government, which Mousavi somehow carries out in his discourse It was arranged. Mohsen Rezaei, with a plot of the difference from the original discourse Volgary, who was centered on the "coalition government", tried to attract the fundamentalist voices that most demanded the emergence of a bipolar movement between Moussawi and Wahmadinejad, rather than Reza'i



and any other candidate. Ahmadinejad Vratsay's position under the discourse of fundamentalism and the placement of Mousavi and Karroubi under the discourse Reformation and, on the other hand, the use of each side of the power strategies to produce antagonism has led to an increase in the social fabric and the unrest in each discourse.

By examining the function of fundamentalists in the period from 2005 to 2009, with the implementation of Ahmadinejad's policies as a representative of the principals in the field of economics, there are weaknesses in the internal politics of the foreign policy, due to the exterior appearance of these weaknesses, the dispersion of their portfolio. In other words, the lack of attention to the elite and expert, the self-concept in the interior and extant, political populism, economic socialism, the central thoracity of the new ideas in the field of religion, etc., make the discourse unique, on the one hand, and the need for the reconstruction of the discourse Principled in order to hegemonic in different levels of social classes To the other side of the conflict, the reformist discourse, which had the failure of 2005 in its history due to the main failure of the united conservative unit, scrutinized its weaknesses, which led to the creation of an antithesis by the reformists, to reconstruct discourse structures We must evaluate the first reading of the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini in this regard. Ultimately, we will come to the conclusion that the struggle between fundamentalist and conscientious discourses in 2009 should be a kind of concerted effort to rebuild the discursive structures of both sides in order to hegemony in the context of society. In this perspective, the gaps in Iranian society are of great importance.

From the perspective of discourse analysis, it is important that the strategy of deconstructing rival discourse and transforming the concept of slogans and decoration of the spirit of discourses based on the interests, desires, demands and needs of society will strengthen the ability of discourses in hegemony. As in the articulation of Ahmadinejad's discourse, the community looked at a fresh and new discourse that even went beyond the boundary of its central slab. The result of this study showed that reform in the formulation of discourse failed to be accessible and credible, and in the knowledge of the problems and problems of the Iranian society inevitably led to another defeat. Still, according to Lacla and Mouffe's approach, there are two criteria for the granting of discourses, namely availability and capability Be valid. In other words, in the tenth presidential election, there was a gap between the minutes of the reformist dialogue and the sectarian order governing society. But the fundamentalist discourse, which is the traditional intellectual representative of this trend, is traditionalism, although people who have embraced the republican symbol in their hearts, but according to the themes and timing of their discourse, especially the signs of "justice" and "Islamic state" in the struggle of tradition and modernity, of traditionalism talked. The most important reason for the victory of this discourse in the tenth election was that it had a true impression of Iranian society, and its articulation showed that impression so that social subjects sought and solved their problems in its mirror.

In this paper, we use the discourse theory of Lacla and Mouffe and Freclough to examine the context of the discourses of the tenth presidential election, and then we examined the impact of social cleavages on the discourse conflicts of the two fundamentalist and reformist groups in this election. Compared to other approaches, discourse analysis has the benefits of examining this election. Structural or class approaches provide useful and important analyzes, but these approaches alone can not be adequately addressed. Discourse analysis is partly used to clarify some obscure aspects of the election. One of the achievements of this research is to show the



evolution and variety in reformist discourses and fundamentalism. Also, discourse can win the election

- 1) is acceptable and accessible
- 2) Attract the range of equivalence chains of other candidates and create a different image in the minds of the people.
- 3) Organize press and mass media around the central axis of discourse.
- 4) The minutes of his discourse are simple so that all the members of the community understand it.

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