




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The comparison of the role of social obligations and the dignity of conversation in the formation of meaning in Wittgenstein, John Hick, Alston, and Searle's perspective

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ABSTRACT

Some scholars regard the language of religion to be different from conventional one (or the language of science). Hence, they consider the cause of several problems and complexities of understanding religion in the lack of the correct understanding of this language. Considering the breadth of views on the language of religion, this research explores only four of them (Wittgenstein, John Hick, Austin, and Searle). The interface of these four views is the idea that meaning is somehow reduced to function in the language of religion. Nevertheless, John Hick adheres to this postulate to a limited degree. Two methodological factors will be compared in these perspectives: the role of social obligations in the formation of meaning and the dignity of conversation or levels of understanding. The purpose of this study is to obtain a methodological model with a descriptive, analytical method of comparative comparison of these views based on four factors. The conclusion of the research shows that social commitments and dignity of conversation are effective in the creation of meaning in the Wittgenstein's model. John Hick and Alston seem to have involved the dignity of conversation in his model. In Searle's model of meaning, the word implies meaning based on social convention in the other hand social obligations are clearly prominent in the creation of meaning.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, John Hick, Austin, Searle, Language of Religion

INTRODUCTION

1. Expressing the problem

One of the critical topics in the philosophy of religion is the consideration of its language. The language of religion is God speaking to man, and the religious language is the man talking about and with God. Religious linguistics is one of the issues that has attracted the attention of several thinkers in the present century, although General philosophy of language background in Western culture goes dates to the views of Plato and Aristotle (Stiver 1997, 8). The language of religion has features distinctive from the conventional language or the scientific language. Many scholars maintain that, unlike common language, one faces several layers and levels of signification in the language of religion. This intricacy can yield a misunderstanding (Braithwaite 1964, 229-251). Considering the extent of theories in the language of religion, the depth, and reach of each, this research examines four critical factors among the four theories that have reduced meaning in the language of religion to its function. Here are these four theories:

- 1- Wittgenstein's theory
- 2- John Hick's theory



3- Austin's theory

4- Searle's theory

The research method in this study is descriptive-analytical. First, based on a library study, an attempt has been made to refer to top priority sources as much as possible. Next, the most critical points per the criteria are assessed using the descriptive-analytical method. Finally, by comparing these four theories, a methodological model is introduced. The four benchmark theories of this research are analyzed and compared based on two factors:

1- Social obligations and commitments in the formation of meaning in religious propositions.

2- the dignity of conversation or levels of understanding in the language of religion.

Before examining the significance theories, the stated factors are introduced and recognized.

1-1 Social obligations and commitments in the formation of meaning

In conversation, conceptual and assertoric implications are distinguished (Distinction between conception (taşawwur) and assertion (taşdıq)). The conceptual implication is the transfer of the addressee's mind to the meaning of the term. In this type of implication, the speaker's will is not a requisite as soon as the addressee hears the word. assertoric implication refers to a situation in which the word implies the intended meaning of the speaker. In this type of implication, simply conveying the meaning to the mind of the addressee is not the only requirement, but the meaning desired must be understood (Soltani 2014, 45). Hence, assertoric implication occurs if the addressee understands the speaker's intent, and it is not enough to merely pronounce the word.

Two chief terms are considered for the development of assertoric implication:

A- Social obligations and commitments

B- the dignity of conversation or levels of understanding

The meaning of the first term is that meaning forms in the context of society and is influenced by its traits. Also, to form the meaning, people in the community must be committed in the sense that the word means. Otherwise, although there are contracts and rules for the meaning of words, the meaning is not recognized because there is no obligation.

1-2. The dignity of conversation and levels of understanding in the language of religion

The dignity of conversation and the level of understanding also affect the acknowledgment of meaning by the addressee. The dignity of conversation means that in cases where descriptions of God or an event of the resurrection are depicted in the scriptures, should these words be regarded as common expressions among human beings and material things - in which words have the same implication in their usual sense - or do they have a different and other hidden meaning? The level of understanding can be influenced by the dignity of conversation. For instance, suppose a person admits to drinking while reciting a poem. Here, the level of understanding is the level of the poem. Since the level of understanding is certainly a category of poetry where words are employed as metaphors or symbols, it cannot be equated with a discussion in which the person confesses directly in court. The possibility of an error in recognizing the conversation level changes the legality of the assertoric implication of the phrase.

1. Wittgenstein's approach to the significance of religious propositions



Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has two periods of thought, in each of which he has a distinct view of the significance of religious propositions. Accordingly, Wittgenstein's approach is presented in two parts.

1-2. Wittgenstein's first intellectual and philosophical period

Under the influence of Russell, Wittgenstein turned his attention to formal language, especially logic during this period. "Picture Theory of Language" is one of his initiatives at this time. His opinion of the implication of meaning can be summarized as: "Language represents the reality of the world. In the sense that it is like a mirror that reflects the outside world" (Wittgenstein 1961, T4.022, T4.025). Hence, the propositions that exist in language mirror the external reality. Phrases such as "The wall is white," refer to realities outside: the wall refers to the external reality of the wall, white refers to an outside reality (white), and the combination of the two refers to a state of the outside world (Sajedi 2011, 56). The problem occurs when sentences and propositions refer to things that have no reality outside: things that are beyond the empirical reality including metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and religion, which are things beyond the tangible reality (Ayer 1936, 797). For Wittgenstein, such natures are mysterious and about which one can only keep silent because such matters cannot be spoken of in the form of the picture theory of language (Wittgenstein 1961, T6.522). This theory (Picture theory of language) was highly influential in a movement, later known as logical positivism.

2-2. Wittgenstein's second intellectual and philosophical period

In his second intellectual period, he proposed the theory arguing that what determines the meaning of a proposition is the application of that proposition. So, he succinctly says, "Do not ask the meaning of a proposition, but seek its application." It is the use that will prove the meaning of a statement. In the *Investigation of Philosophy*, he has explicitly elaborated and explained the issue of how the application of words determines their meanings. This doctrine states that there is no such intrinsic relationship between words, phrase and meaning, but the implication of meaning is a sort of contract determined by the use of language speakers. This application is a function of its own social paradigm, which Wittgenstein refers to as the "form of life" (Mahdavi Nejad 2005, 71). In other words, in different forms of life, a word may find different meanings, depending on the different uses of the word among those speakers. He considers such a thing as a "language game". He concludes that we face various language games. In every language game, terms may have their own different meanings. He holds that the rules governing one language cannot be extended to another language game. Of course, this does not imply that all words should have distinct meanings in different language games. Consequently, in the language of religion, meaning is formed in the language game and social paradigm of religious people, different from other language games (Wittgenstein 1958, 23).

" Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the existence of this being, but, e.g., sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, - life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of 'object'." (Wittgenstein 1980, 86)

2-3. Wittgenstein's methodological features in the formation of meaning



Wittgenstein's first philosophical period:

- 1- Religious propositions do not implicate something (experimental) by accepting the "picture theory" of language. In this sense, they are meaningless.
- 2- Due to the meaninglessness of these statements, two factors of the dignity of conversation or social obligations are not considered in this view.
- 3- Accordingly, he considers religious propositions beyond the tangible reality that they have a mysterious nature, and one can only remain silent about them.

Wittgenstein's second philosophical period:

- 1- A word has different meanings in different forms of life or different paradigms owing to its distinct applications. Thus, the implication of meaning is determined by the application.
- 2- The use of language to express religious beliefs is entirely different from its application as an expression of reality.
- 3- Social obligations and commitments are effective in the creation of meaning. Meaning formed in the language game and social paradigm of religious people is different from other language games.
4. The dignity of conversation is another feature of his theory. Because expressing a religious belief is not same as a scientific prediction or hypothesis, but rather "Believing means submitting to an authority."(Wittgenstein 1980, 45) Wittgenstein says that detractors and advocates who confuse religious beliefs with "hypotheses" and collect evidence to support or deny them are, in fact, mixing religious faith and superstition.
5. In this approach, religious propositions are significant. His theory can be considered as a non-cognitive theory because he equates having religious beliefs with the use of religious concepts and having the positions and emotions that are required from the use of these concepts. He puts it Frankly: "It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference."(Wittgenstein 1980, 64)

3. John Hick

John Hick also considers religious propositions presentable by positivist standards. To this end, he suggested the theory of eschatological verification. By presenting the theory of eschatological verification, he has attempted to prove that most religious propositions are significant and provable (Hick 1988, 169-171). provability is not only a logical thing but also a compound of logical and psychological issues. When it is stated that a proposition has been proven, it means that someone has proved it. He compares proof to knowing and assumes that proof is an experience that makes a person aware of the truth of a statement (Hosseini 2010, 95). There is an experience in the proposition "God exists" as it is in other religious propositions that shows its truth and leaves no room for doubt. This kind of proposition is significant and true because it has all the characteristics of provability. Therefore, a proposition is significant when it can be proved empirically; but the critical point in his theory is that these experiences do not have to be actual. The Hereafter experiences are potential, and potential experience are sufficient for proof. It should also be noted that John Hick does not consider religious experiences as only the experiences of the Hereafter but also highlights other human experiences that anyhow lead to the perception of God in human life (Rezaei 2002, 291).



As discussed, in his view, most religious propositions are significant and provable, but some other religious beliefs and propositions are not. For instance, he does not accept the doctrine of the incarnation and divinity of Christ in Christianity and concludes that these dogmas have no clear sense and are incomprehensible. His policy for this part of the religious propositions is to offer a critical realist approach. On the one hand, he calls these propositions metaphors, and on the other hand, he insists their function in religious life (mezginejad 2022, 184). Hick uses a parable to demonstrate the function of religious propositions in life. Suppose two people with only one path ahead of them and unavoidably have to continue on the path. Person A maintains that this road leads to a heavenly, celestial city. But person B declares that the road goes nowhere and that there is no destination. There are countless joys and difficulties during this journey (Hick 1989, 93-94). Person A asserts that the road designer put pleasure and unhappiness in testing me to see if I am still interested in that city. But person B says that the ultimate use of happiness must be made, and challenges must be endured. So, happiness and sorrow occur for both. The difference in the perception of the two is from the path: significant for person "A" and aimless, aimless and meaningless for person "B". And as long as the two are on this track, neither can prove their claim and deny the other. Plus, this road is one-way, and after the last turn of the road, things will be provable and deniable. From John Hick's point of view, this road is our life, and those two are human beings. John Hick presupposes that religious propositions and their contradictions are neither logically deductible nor refutable in this world, and only in another world can the truth of these statements be learned. Accordingly, we do not see in this world theoretically a difference between the monotheistic and atheistic views, and what exists is a practical difference (Hosseini 2010, 22). On the one hand, he considers religious beliefs such as the divinity of Jesus (PBUH) - which has an ambiguous and unclear meaning and its acceptance means the approval of a being with contradictory properties - to be effective in the religious life, and on the other hand, he considers these propositions metaphorical. Hick, who seeks to rationalize the beliefs of Christianity, proposes the metaphorical theory of the language of religion in a paradoxical part of the beliefs of the Christian religion, and, following Kant, calls his view "realism." John Hick splits realism into two categories: simple and critical. Simple realism says that we understand the world precisely as it is, and the words used in religious manuals are taken literally according to reality. In contrast, critical realism maintains that the senses are influenced by the world around them, but our perceptions are restricted to concepts and language; Our perception of the world around us is such that our concepts and language allow. The boundaries of language make the relationship between words and meaning and the type of implication of words used in religious texts different from other conventional terms. To put it simply, such words have a metaphorical meaning. They are used to refer to facts that go exceeding the appearance of the word - facts that are believed to be effective in religious life. Therefore, such propositions have a metaphorical meaning that belief in them has practical effectiveness. (Hick 1995, 101).

In short, although he does not believe the truth of the story of the incarnation of the divinity and the Trinity (because they are irrational), he concludes that we can accept them metaphorically and be influenced by them.

4-1. Methodological features of John Hick's theory

1. The most notable characteristic of John Hick's theory is that it is cognitive;



2. He sought to show that religious propositions are as significant as scientific propositions and can withstand the tests of positivism significance.

3- Some of the words employed in religious texts are not literally significant and their metaphorical meaning is considered;

4- In his view, the restriction of language causes the relationship between word and meaning and the type of implication of words used in religious texts to be distinct from other conventional words. The language of religion in some parts is a symbolic to point to facts beyond the appearance of words! For this reason, it can be said that he has included the dignity of conversation in his theory;

5. In some religious propositions, the relationship between word and meaning cannot be denotation but its connotation;

6- He has not explicitly addressed the issue of social obligations and commitments in formation

4- Alston's functionalist view

William Payne Alston (1921) is one of the American analytical philosophers whose views on the fundamentalism, internalism, verbal actions, and epistemological merit of mystical experiences have been very influential. With an anti-positivist approach, Alston maintains that based on the shared function of attributes between God and man, the physical and possible features of these attributes can be set aside, and God can be spoken about in a real and significant way (Abdollahi and Bakhshi 2011, 135 -136). By introducing the theory of functionalism, he attempts to interpret the shared attributes between man and God, such as science, power, life, will, etc., in a fashion that applies to God and man in a real and common way. In other words, despite the apparent differences between God and man, common concepts can be obtained from shared attributes between man and God. He also considers the secret of speaking the truth about God to find the common concepts between man and God. If a single and shared concept can be abstracted from the attributes shared between man and God, we can speak about God in a real and significant form. He also holds that the origin of the abstraction of such notions, their function, and action in the life of a religious person. Austin separated three types of "performative utterance" (the action of the speaker):

1. Locutionary act: In each sentence, the words are used regularly and create a comprehensible meaning.

2. Perlocutionary act: the state or effect that occurs in the addressee after hearing the speech - whether intentional or unintentional. The distinction between a "Locutionary act" and a "Perlocutionary act" is that the effect of a "Locutionary act" is predictable and subject to contract. But the "Perlocutionary act" is unpredictable and unconventional.

3. Illocutionary act: It is what the speaker does with the content of his speech, such as asking questions, informing, begging, and the like (Austin 1962, 108-110).

Alston according to Austin's division believes that meaning in religious propositions is related to and is a function of "Illocutionary act". But the realization of "Perlocutionary act" implies some kind of effect on the addressee, while "Illocutionary act" has nothing to do with the passivity and effect of the addressee. Also, "Illocutionary act" are based on the "Locutionary act" while in "Perlocutionary act" the addressee can be influenced without words (Alston 1963, 116). Hence, all metaphors, especially those that refer to the attributes and actions of God, have the potential



to become real expressions, and to some extent, they can be interpreted realistically (Abdollahi and Bakhshi 2011, 142). Alston considers the inherent characteristic of metaphor to be that at least it deserves this amount of true expression; Otherwise, there is no understanding of metaphor and knowledge of God.

4-1. Functionalism in the significance of religious propositions

In essays such as "Functionalism and Theological Language" or "Divine Nature and Human Language" Alston tries to find a way to properly analyze attributes such as the verb creation, the divine will, the purpose of God, and divine knowledge. By comparing the function of these traits in man and God, he provides meanings for these attributes. In his idea, functionalism has a significant part in the significance of religious propositions (Alizamani and Naghavi 2009, 65). Since God is essentially different from man in existence and nature, words in religious propositions do not imply meaning in the same way as non-religious propositions. The chief question is, Does God have a human-like function so that a united idea can be abstracted from their function? Some attributes are used in the same sense about God and man, and applying these characteristics to God is in the real sense of these attributes - not metaphorical. But he studied the attributes that differentiate between God and man and explained that this distinction does not prevent the functional sharing of attributes between God and man. Alston considers three distinguishing attributes: the incorporeal, the timeless, and the infinity of God. By examining these attributes, he also shows the shared function between man and God in these attributes (Alston 1996, 64).



4-2. Methodological characteristics of Alston's theory

- 1- We can speak about God in a real and significant fashion;
- 2- Considering the shared function of the attributes between God and man and his accent on the fact that the physical and possible characteristics of these attributes should be set aside to speak about God in a real and significant way, it turns out that he included dignity of conversation in this theory;
- 3- Since the meaning in religious propositions is related to the "Illocutionary act" determined by the function of these attributes, the connection between word and meaning is explicit according to his interpretation;
- 4- The origin of abstraction of such notions is the function and practice of these attributes;
5. Alston's theory on the significance of religious propositions is not dependent on social obligations and commitments.

5. significance Religious propositions in Searle's approach to significance

John Searle is among the leading contemporary philosophers in the fields of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Although he is an atheist, his views on the significance of language are very important. Hence, examining the significance of religious propositions from this perspective is of unique importance. After Austin, his student Searle followed the path of his teacher. Over 40 years, he studied the aspects of the problem of meaning and significance. He developed and improved the theory of "speech acts". Among the traits of his theory is the sundering of the classical boundaries between "constative utterance" and "performative utterance", as well as his fundamental accent on the intention of the speaker (Searle 1968, 407).

Searle has restricted the "speech acts" to the existence of the intention of the speaker. Speech acts is the application of significant words and symbols based on the purpose of the speaker.

"acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating; and, secondly, that these acts are in general made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements. (Searle 1969, 16)"

According to this definition, he differentiated between Sentence meaning and Speaker meaning. The "speech acts" consists of two parts: one part is the application of (significant) words and signs, and the other part is the intention of the speaker (Abdullahi 2005, 111). The meaning of the sentence is a function of the contract and the rules of language. These laws and conventions are formed in the community, and the person will get the meaning of the sentence if he is familiar with these rules and contracts. But the speaker's intention is also influential in Searle's approach. The speaker employs words to express his purpose. Words will be significant if they are formed per the rules and contracts of each language. It is in this case that the words will be significant in nature. But the intention of the speaker is beyond this meaning and causes the specific meaning of the sentences to be desired. Hence, in examining the meaning of a sentence, merely analyzing words from the perspective of linguistic contracts and rules is not enough; Another component must be considered that is the intention of the speaker. To summarize his theory, it can be assumed that successful and accurate speech act in presenting the meaning depends, firstly, on the intention of the speaker and secondly, following the rules and precepts of language (Searle 1979, 80). In analyzing Searle's theory of significance, it should be stated that since the meaning of words is formed in the context of society and the contract of society, meaning can be considered a social phenomenon. However, on the other hand, the intention of the speaker is also included in creating meaning. Consequently, the view of the speaker affects the meaning, and, accordingly, the meaning will have an individual dimension.

Institutional fact is another factor in Searle's intellectual system. Institutional fact, as in Wittgenstein's system of thought, can be described as "the manner in which words are applied in the context of society" in the other words, the fact formed in the context of society, and words find meaning within it. If we have the word X, the role of Institutional fact (C) can be represented as, "The word X in context C means Y." Accordingly, from Searle's point of view, the word finds its meaning in a context called Institutional fact (Abdullahi 2005, 114). Hence, the Institutional fact is a social contract independent of the speaker and the listener. The speaker and the listener will be able to make a comprehensible speech if they are "devoted to this social contract of how the word is employed in the context of society." Different situations can be assumed for the Institutional fact (Searle 1979, 96). That institutional fact situation is not yet fully developed, in which case there is not much commitment to such a social contract. For instance, in the context of childish language dialogue, there is not such a strong social contract and such adherence to this contract. The second level is communication, and in the second case, although there is a commitment that words be said in the context of institutional fact or based on the social convention, but institutional fact may be low in content at one level of society and high at another. For instance, culturally inferior classes, or even strange with urban matters, certainly have a weaker institutional fact in their society. In such a community, words that are specific to



a more complex institutional fact will not be comprehensible (Searle 1979, 251). Third, in a society with the same cultural context, speakers in different positions factor in different institutional facts. For instance, in a Fruit market, the level of speech is definitely different from that of a university. This is affected by the institutional fact settled in these positions. In the fourth case, a distinct institutional fact may predominate in a limited part of society, for example, a group of scientists, as they have a more complex level of social contracts (Abtahi 2011, 181). Therefore, perception is formed if, first, the speaker and the addressee have a familiarity with the institutional fact, and, second, they consider themselves dedicated to that institutional fact. The language of religion is no exception to this precept. As the Prophet (PBUH) also declared that the perceptual boundaries of the addressee be considered in the expression of religious rules and laws. The Prophet (PBUH) said, "Speak to the people according to their intellect and understanding." This explains the role of institutional fact in the development of language and communication (Searle 1979, 123). Because if it is not spoken to the extent of people's intellect and according to the way the word is employed in the context of society, communication will not happen and the speaker will not be understood. For illustration, in Shiite societies, social matters such as mourning, resort, pilgrimage, and so on, which are determined by genuine Islamic thought, are institutionalized in social laws and contracts and will be considered as an institutional fact. Such institutional fact will have its own purpose and will eventually be the source of meaning for words that are not used in such a sense in other societies. Accordingly, in Shiite societies, owing to the impact of such an institutional fact, sentences may be asserted that do not have an understandable meaning at all in societies with different religions and cultures or the meaning that is meant by the Shiites is not obtained.



5-1. Methodological features of Searle's theory

1. Searle did not directly assert his theory of the language of religion. Hence, the study of methodological factors can be conducted with this assumption of his philosophy of language.
2. Words are formed by social contracts. The word implies its own meaning according to the social percept that issues in society.
3. The sole existence of the word and the awareness of the social convention do not reveal the cause-and-effect relationship between the word used by the speaker and the meaning he is referring to. The causal relationship between word and meaning depends, firstly, on the institutional fact "how the word is employed in the context of society" in which the speaker practices the word in that institutional fact, and secondly, on the extent of the speaker's devotion to this institutional fact. If it can be said that there is a causal relationship between the word and the meaning, all these conditions can be satisfied. According to this theory, social commitments are clearly prominent in the formation of meaning in religious propositions;
- 4- According to Searle's view, the word is the signifier, and meaning is the signified (referent) that the speaker meant to express, and what establishes the implication is the awareness of institutionalized fact;
5. The dignity of conversation or levels of understanding between transcendent facts and other things has not been established in Searle's theory, but the dignity of conversation has been reduced to institutional fact. Consequently, it can be stated that speaking of transcendent affairs has an institutionalized fact different from other matters;
- 6- Cognitive or non-cognitive language of religion has not been discussed in this theory.

Conclusion

Reducing meaning to the "application" is the common denominator of four theories whose methodological features were examined and compared with two factors. The results are summarized below:

Wittgenstein: In the first period of Wittgenstein's thought - by accepting the "picture theory" of language - the religious propositions were meaningless because they implied nothing (empirically). Hence, the two factors of the dignity of conversation and social obligations are not considered in this view. Further, in his view, religious propositions are "non-cognitive". Nonetheless, he considers religious propositions to be beyond the tangible fact that has a mysterious nature, and that one can only remain silent about them.

By insisting that "application" defines the meaning of words, in his second intellectual period, Wittgenstein reveals that a word has different uses in different forms of life, and therefore, has various meanings. Social commitments and devotions are effective in the creation of meaning. The dignity of conversation is another aspect of his theory.

John Hick: He maintains that religious propositions are as meaningful as scientific propositions, they can withstand the tests of positivism significance, and they are cognitive. Nevertheless, the boundaries of language cause the significance to be different in a part of the language of religion. In some parts, the language of religion is a code for pointing to facts beyond the appearance of the words. In this case, the connection between words and meaning is not denotation but it is connotation. That is why he seems to have involved the dignity of conversation in his theory. It was also proved that social obligations were not stated in his theory.

Alston: In his functionalist view, one can speak of God in a true and significant manner; But the source of the abstraction of such notions is function and action. Considering the function of the traits shared between God and man and the acquittal of the physical and possible characteristics of these traits, one can truly speak of God. In religious propositions, the "Illocutionary act" is determined by the function of these traits. Therefore, the link between words and meaning is explicit (Denotational) according to his interpretation. The meaning of the word in religious propositions matches its corresponding function. Alston's theory on the significance of religious propositions is not dependent on social devotions. Nonetheless, the dignity of conversation is included in this theory, and this theory is cognitive.

Searle: In his theory of significance, the word implies meaning based on social convention. Further, the sole existence of the words and knowledge of the social contract is not sufficient to determine the meaning. Rather, the causal connection between word and meaning depends, first, on how the word is employed in the context of society - called institution act - and, second, on the extent of the speaker's dedication to this institution act. Social obligations are clearly prominent in the creation of meaning. The cognition or non-cognition of the language of religion is not addressed in this theory, and the dignity of conversation is reduced to the issue of institution act.

The methodological model predominant in these theories is listed in the table below:



	The type of implication of meaning in religious propositions	Commitments and social obligations in the formation of meaning in religious propositions	The dignity of conversation or levels of understanding in the language of religion	Cognitive or non-cognitive language of religion
Wittgenstein's first view	(Insignificant)	Nonexistent	Nonexistent	Non-cognitive
Wittgenstein's second view	denotation	existent	Exists	Non-cognitive
John Hick's view	Partially connotation and partially denotation	Nonexistent	Exists	Cognitive
Alston's view	denotation	Nonexistent	Exists	Cognitive
Searle's view	denotation	existent	Nonexistent	_____

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